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Introduction
This series of Occasional Papers is designed to bring to the attention of the reader
work that focuses on Asian communication and culture. Compared to most areas
of Asian Studies, communication and media have been largely ignored, a fact the
recent Australian 'push into Asia' reveals. These Occasional Papers redress this
absence and deal with a comprehensive range of issues that inform our
understanding of the importance of communication in forging links between
Australia and Asia. Consequently their scope is far-reaching, covering cultural,
political, economic, and increasingly, technological topics and their relationship
to the communication process that lies at the heart of Australian/Asian relations.
In short, they will chart a new emerging mediascape in the Asia Pacific region.
As such they must be viewed as work in progress. The authors published in this
series include academics, journalists and post-graduate students from Australia
and throughout Asia.
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Introduction

Australia did not discover Cambodia until after the Second World War. In the
early 1950s 'Indochina' was just becoming part of the Australian strategic map.
In the wake of the Chinese revolution, the Korean W� and the collapse of French
Indochina at Dien Bien Phu, Australia's 'Cold Warriors' were alerted to the new
potential threats to our North. To counter these threats the ANZUS and SEATO
Treaties were signed, coupled with anti-communist repression on the home front.
In this political environment the media closely followed the dictates of the
conservative Menzies Government in Asian affairs and foreign policy.
The 'Anglophile' Australian media were far from being 'Asia literate'.
Throughout the fifties and early sixties foreign affairs reporting closely
mimicked the British and American 'neo-colonialist' lines with few exceptions.
Indochina in this period was far from newsworth�: A survey of the Sydney
Morning Herald between 1959-61 revealed on avefage no more than six news
entries on Cambodia annually. 1 On the other hand, Indonesia, with the West Irian
crisis and fears that Suharto's 'Guided Democracy' would throw up a dictator on
our doorsteps competed with the perennial fear of Ch\na as the dominant 'Asian'
issues in the Australian press.
All this changed with the commitment of Australian ground troops to Vietnam
to support the American effort in 1965. Vietnam was in the news, and along with
the conscription debacle became a major media issue in the 1966 Federal
elections. The Vietnam War compelled media institutions to improve their
coverage of both the war and the region as a whole. In spite of this development,
Cambodia remained the insignificant 'sideshow' and backwater. It was not until
1970, with Sihanouk's overthrow and US-ARVN ground troops expanding the
Vietnam conflict into 'neutral' Cambodia, that coverage increased. The US
troops withdrawing two months later from Cambodia marked the start of another
decline in news coverage. Nixon's 'Vietnamisation' program, and then
Watergate, took centre stage as the big US television and wire services continued
to swamp the Australian coverage of events in Indochina. America's Vietnam
and American news priorities were still 'The Main Game'.

In this context, the secret US aerial decimation of Cambodia remained a scanty
footnote in the Australian media until it ceased in August 1973. It was only in the
lead up and aftermath of the collapse of Phnom Penh in April 1975 to the Khmer
Rouge forces, an event that eclipsed the fall of Saigon by two weeks, that global
news media's attention was focused on Cambodia. It was yet again a short-lived
focus. The new Democratic Kampuchea regime imposed a thorough media
closure against the Western press. The news vacuum was replaced with
speculation, black propaganda and some genuine horror stories of human
suffering from border refugee testimonies. But Indochina on the whole faded
from the international news pages as the West silently took stock of its historic
defeat. Sporadic recriminations based on refugee accounts about the new regimes
and war veteran legacies were featured periodically in the media. The enormous
redevelopment and reconstruction problems of the Indochinese countries were
ignored totally.
_ Indochina re-emerged with a vengeance as an international news event on the eve
of Vietnam's Christmas 1978 - January 1979 invasion of Cambodia and China's
'teach them a lesson' coun�er-strike into Northern Vietnam the following
months. The end of Democratic Kampuchea marked a massive schism in Asian
and world Communist solidarity. From 1979 there was a gradual re-opening of
Cambodia to the Western media. Thence followed a decade of selective, openly
partisan and ideologically-driy.._en reporting of the Cambodia conflict as it became
the centre-piece of regional and superpower rivalry. The Vietnamese troop
withdrawal in October 1989 marked the beginning of a new media circus. The
UN imposed diplomatic solution created visa openings for the 'scoop' hungry
journalists of the world. The Western media itself at times became the issue with
some observers drawing direct comparisons with the carpetbaggers and
chequebook journalists that punctuated the Lon Nol period of the early 1970s.
Australian news coverage of:Cambodia was now becoming more extensive.
Freer access for both regional and Australian based correspondents, permanent
Phnom Penh offices for wire services like Reuters and regional press and radio
correspondents, like Sue Dowpie, meant a more reliable and consistent coverage
of Cambodian affairs. Improved telecommunications after OTC's satellite hook
up led to the first 'live' coverage of events witnessed on Australian television.
But this was still sporadic coverage and orientated around big events like
Sihanouk's return and the Khfeu Samphan attack.

2

In spite of a professed re-orientation 'towards Asia' at the political level in
Australia from the early 1990s and a direct military involvement through
UNTAC, the improved flow of news on the ground from Cambodia faced the old
stumbling blocs of a continuing Anglo-Ameri�an and Eurocentric sense of
priorities back in the Australian news rooms and, editor desks. Royal family
gossip, the slightest twitch in the White House or� events in Moscow were still
higher news priorities than events inside Cambodia.
The low priority of Cambodia allowed old practices to continue. Visiting
reporters flowed in 'on assignment'. Often poorly briefed and harbouring the
'cultural baggage' of the Seventies and Eighties era, they repetitiously churned
out the 'genocide' angle, Toul Sleng and Angkor Wat postcards, peppered with
unconfirmed gossip gleaned from Hun Sen and UNTAC press aides which was
usually thrown in as an afterthought to round off the report. There was very little
serious in-depth reporting that explored the unresolved Khmer grievances
created by the shortcomings of the UN peace plan. A few professional journalists
briefed themselves with a modicum of Khmer language proficiency and
attempted to dig out the real picture.
The historical legacy of newly arrived foreign c9Frespondents being seduced,
awed and fascinated by Cambodia, its Prince, its people and the temple Angkor
Wat, was now being repeated. Like tourists in a strange land, imbued with the
full canopy of Western preconceptions, the journalists were high on description
but low on analysis. Edward Said's often cited denigration of Westerners for
their 'Orientalism' was generally speaking an appropriate description of both the
new breed and the old hands of the Cambodia school of journalism. There were
· exceptions of course. However, most new correspondents infused their reporting
with predictable references to the exotica, the despots, the mystical and the
yearned for universalism. All of which served merely to dress up the Western
prejudice that permeated the political dross in their reports. A dross invariably
introduced by the words "diplomatic sources said".
In short, many journalists revealed more about pre-existing Australian
perceptions of this corner of Asia in their despatches than they did about any
contemporary Cambodian political realities. The 'horror' of modern Cambodia,
in the short space of time between the appearance of John Pilger's Heroes in the
mid 1980s and Margaret Drabble's The Gates of Ivory in the early 1990s, had
shifted its metaphor from the 'heroism of the messenger' to an 'imagined space
for resolving Western conscience'.2 As Robin Gerster noted in his review of the
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Drabble book, there was a certain cultural capital that had accumulated around
the modern Asian holocaust. And it was one that more than a few Western
writers were willing to cash in on.
But more importantly, the Cambodian media legacy has its own rite de passage
which each new correspondent must duly acknowledge before venturing into the
somewhat unfathomable world of commenting on contemporary Cambodia
3
affairs. The continued imposition of an 'outside solution' onto the Cambodian
masses inevitably comes dressed up as 'international concern'. Rather than self
examine copy for evidence of paternalism or neo-colonialism at work the
Western correspondent seeks refuge for their uncertainty and self-doubt by
reference to some transcendental or universal message that purportedly lies
beneath the modern Cambodian tragedy. Witness David Puttnam's use of John
Lennon's song Imagine to end The Killing Fields movie.
But Puttnam's pairing of Western angst with Cambodian suffering was not
original. The Australian novelist Maslen Williams travelled to Cambodia in 1969
on an Australian writer's grant. From the comfort of his Phnom Penh Hotel,
unaware of the country about to be swept into the Vietnam War, he penned,
... The function that I have lately imposed upon myselfas an Australian writer
is to search this part of the earth for clues that may help to get us out of the
maze in which we are all lo'fr, and wandering. I am one among many ill
equipped literary diggers who fossick in the unlikely waste places of this age
for specimens of truth that may lead to some rich lode of understanding from
which we may all someday, enrich ourselves the people of all races - and
begin to live a finer, kindlier, more courageous and mutually creative way of
life.4

The "Cambodia problem" has been with us for some decades now. An Australian
approach of heavy involvement hi Cambodian affairs was developed in the 1960s
and carried through the 1970s. Australians of various persuasions have
distinguished themselves, often with some degree of controversy, in both our
journalistic and diplomatic exctfanges with Cambodia. This 'finger on the pulse'
trend intensified by the late 1980s with the emergence of a distinct Cambodia
lobby in Australia consisting o{diplomats, journalists, aid workers, academics
and others who collectively m�lded public opinion to accept a 'New
w S�dard
.
Consensus' or revisionist view M contemporary Cambodian history.)Vhile
the
American media had an agenda-set, a Western media consensus of 'bloodbath'
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and 'genocide' as the standard perjorative descriptions for the new regimes in the
immediate post-1975 period emerged,5 the new media brokers or 'revisionists'
sought to rewrite history with their own post-1979 version. The media-speak of
the 'revisionists' involved creating a new consensus, one which exculpated
Vietnam by presenting their invasion of Cambodia•as a variety of humanitarian
rescue.6
Today the supporters of the New Standard Consensus still have the upper hand.
The proof of this is in the shifting media agenda for reporting Cambodia. An
UNTAC force was sent to Cambodia ostensibly to verify the Vietnamese
withdrawal and oversee the implementation of a peace plan. Now, most
observers advocate that its fundamental function sh.ould be to contain the growth
and influence of the Khmer Rouge faction. Were this just a case of bringing a
recalcitrant party to the peace agreement back into line then there would be no
qualms. But as the study below shows the new media agenda is a prescriptive
one, one that insists that only certain outcomes are permissible, rather than one
that impartially allows the Khmer to decide.
The Western media worked to ensure the main beneficiaries of that
'humanitarian rescue', (the Hun Sen's circle), emer� as the victors of the current
power struggle in Phnom Penh that climaxed in the May 1993 election. The real
problem lay in deciding whether the ultimate beneficiaries of this remoulding of
W estem opinion will be the Cambodian people as a whole or some discredited
elite that rules the country on behalf of themselves,'or worse still, some foreign
patron. Thus to expect more than a modest correlation between the way
Cambodia is reported in Australia and the way events actually beset the average
Cambodian may be unduly optimistic. To understand why this discrepancy exists
we have to unravel the legacy of Australian (and Western) journalism on
Cambodia. A legacy that, unfortunately, has often worked side-by-side with
forces seeking to undermine, rather than support, the Khmer independence
struggle.
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2.

The Sihanouk Period (1953-70)

Two Australians who distinguished themselves from early in the post-war years
as prolific writers on Asian affairs were Wilfred Burchett and Denis Warner. 7
Politically these writers were ideological opponents. Both had covered the
Japanese war in the Pacific, the Korean War, the French Indochina War and
naturally became deeply involved in the American and Australian debate over
our growing military commitment to Indochina throughout the 1960s. Of the
two, Burchett reported the war 'from the other side'. His reports were often
controversial and since the Korean War he was much maligned in Australia by
conservative politicians and newspaper editorialists alike for his efforts.
Despite such unpopularity Burchett was often much closer to the centre of action,
in both the jungle warfare and the diplomatic sense. His close understanding of
the inner-workings of both the Ho Chi Minh cabinet and the Sihanouk court gave
him a unique Indochina perspective. Burchett first visited Cambodia in 19568 and
the following year wrote Mekong Upstream9 which was published in Vietnamese
by Hanoi. It became "the first beok about twentieth century Cambodian politics
in any language".10 Where Burchett presented a vivid description of life in Phnom
Penh where even he, like many other Western observers, 'romanticised' the
Khmers.11 Cambodianist Ben Kiernan criticised Burchett's 'socialist realism' (in
his description of the people) and his 'socialist imagination' (unfounded
conclusion on the unity of Chinese, Vietnamese and Khmers) as unduly
simplistic, but credited his portrayal of Khmer society and its "low living
standards and occasional fierce exploitation at the hands of powerful members
of the elite." 12
But if Burchett's seminal work on the origins of Khmer communism and
independence had been flushed out in Mekong Upstream, so too was another
centre-piece of Khmer politics - an understanding of Sihanouk's neutrality.
Burchett offered rare insight as ''his chapters on (Khmer neutrality) are based on
his interviews with Sihanouk a)\d his valuable eye-witness accounts of the third
and fourth congress of Sihanouk's party, the Sangkum in 1956 and 1957." Here
Burchett described US Ambassador McClintock's disastrous walk out from the
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Third Congress before Sihanouk rose to speak and clumsy US pressure on
Sihanouk to join SEATO. Burchett concluded the real irony of Cambodia's
subsequent 'slide to the left', was that it was precipitated by "the outrageous
behaviour of the US State Department and its representatives in Phnom Penh."13
Kiernan noted that Burchett felt, until then, Sihano'uk would have preferred in
foreign policy a "neutralist, independent Cambodia attached to the West", but
then goes on to recount from Burchett's private correspondence to his father,
how in May 1956, while in Hanoi, he interviewed Prime Minister Pham Van
Dong on Cambodian neutrality where the replies so pleased Sihanouk he used
them in all of Cambodia's national media. 14 In this sense Burchett was both a
player in the game and a close-handed observer of �ambodian politics.
From the opposite side of the political fence, Denis Warner's journalism was
more in tune with the perspective of Australian and US military intelligence
throughout his reporting career in Indochina. Naturally his writing gained a wider
circulation in the daily Western press than that of Burchett. Warner had a deep
insight into the developing peasant-based revolutionary warfare that steadily
engulfed all of what was previously French Indochina, the nations of Vietnam,
Cambodia and Laos. But unlike Burchett, Warner gjd not champion this cause.
His writing was often in the form of a damning prophesy, criticising the bungling
expediency of Western policy. He offered strategic analysis and advice on how
best to contain the growing peasant rebellions, to halt the advance of Asian
communism. In terms of Cambodia, this involved an understanding of Sihanouk
neutrality.
In Reporting South-East Asia, a Warner dateline "Pnom Penh February 1960",
headed "The Prince on the tightrope", quoted Sihanouk outlining the rationale
for Khmer neutrality as being akin to walking a tightrope. Warner added to this
metaphor, "By his recognition of Communist China two years ago, Sihanouk
seemed to have lost his balance in his delicate tightrope act." Proof came from
the apparent pro-China line on the Tibet crisis and the 'anti-Americanism' of the
Cambodian Ministry of Information.15 Thus Warner was sceptical of Sihanouk's
denial of 'the Red Prince' label dubbed on him by the Western press. 16 He berated
Sihanouk's claim that the Cambodian and other Third World people would
eventually "decide the fate of the under-developed countries". He equated
'neutrality' with 'soft on communism' and argued, "to many (Westerners) it still
seems that Sihanouk has opened the country to the challenge of competitive
coexistence on Communist terms and that Peking, not the people, will decide
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Cambodia's fate."17 The spirit of Bandung and non-alignment seemed anathema
to Warner.
Warner wrote extensively for the Australian press, most notably, the Melbourne

Herald. His Reporting South-East Asia book included articles on Cambodia from
the American Reporter magazine written between 1959 and 1966. In the prelude

he described the the collapse of Anglo-American relations with Cambodia in the
mid-l 960s as "one of the sorriest Southeast Asian stories". He argued,
Sihanouk's sense of "national pride" was "belatedly understood". Ignoring his
own record, Warner added that some Western publications, notably Time and
Newsweek, continued "to denigrate the prince and his country in terms
apparently calculated to give the most offence", provoking the Sihanouk
response of "shameful slanders". 18
Such deference to the Prince from Warner was not an accident. In the book

Before Kampuchea, former Australian diplomat and journalist, Milton Osborne,

recalled how Warner himself had incurred the wrath of Sihanouk. When Warner
first visited Cambodia as a journalist in 1960 he arrived in Phnom Penh in the
company of the then Cambodian Ambassador to Australia, Poe Thieun and his
nephew Poe Deuskoma. Warner's reportage of this visit to Cambodia, as it was
subsequently published in an Australian newspaper, was found to be derogatory
of the Royal family by Prince Sjhanouk. Warner was banned from re-entering
Cambodia and become the first of a long line of journalist casualties to cross
Sihanouk. 19

Sihanouk's periodic bans on the Western press reflected how many
correspondents on assignment in Cambodia often did not realise fully that
covering Cambodia was not the same as covering Vietnam. In Vietnam there
were ground rules to avoid censored copy. In Vietnam there was a degree of
certainty over what was acceptable coverage to the US military's media minders,
the Saigon regime functionaries and the editors at home. The pattern in
Cambodia reporting was less certain. The various CIA manoeuvres in
neighbouring Laos kept Sihanouk wary of any who challenged his definition of
Khmer neutrality. Nevertheless, until the US Embassy closed in 1965, the
Sihanouk form of neutrality was an inclusive, rather than exclusive one with
foreign aid and foreign visitors arriving in Phnom Penh from all points on the
globe.
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One journalist who successfully negotiated Sihanouk's quirky mannerisms and
perceived volatility was the Australian cameraman and journalist Neil Davis.
Davis in late 1963 was appointed the first Visn�s cameraman in Southeast
Asia.20 Working out of Singapore from February 1964 he shared the ABC
office.21 He first went to Cambodia in November 1964 to cover the independence
celebrations. His footage of Angkor Wat for Visnews was shown to Prince
Sihanouk whose interest in film led to a warm relationship between the two. It
was useful for Davis in obtaining visas at latter dates when the country was semi
closed to journalists. On this 1964 trip Davis also met Burchett and taught him
how to use a cinecamera. The result was Burchett filmed the Vietcong in action
and Davis sold his footage to Visnews and later to CBS. 22
Burchett had moved to Cambodia from North Vietnam in September 1965 and
resided in Phnom Penh for four years. When welcomed to Phnom Penh by
Sihanouk he brought tidings from the President of the NLF (South Vietnam),
Nguyen Huu Tho, and evidence of a Khmer Serai/CIA plan to overthrow
Sihanouk's neutral government.23 Such exploits became legendary and earned
him the appellation of 'Public Enemy Number One' from Australian
conservatives. The more adventurous Australian correspondents like UPl's
Martin Stuart-Fox made contact with him and publrshed his dissident voice in a
series of short articles for The Australian newspaper.24
Others weren't so lucky. In 1966 ABC correspondent Tony Ferguson and an
ABC film crew managed to get into Cambodia which was officially closed to the
Western media. Ferguson secured an interview with Wilfred Burchett and
despatched the footage. As Tim Bowden noted in his biography of Neil Davis,
"... Meanwhile, in Sydney, all hell broke loose. Burchett was regarded by many
in Australia as a traitor - a view shared by the ABC's Controller of News. He
ordered the Burchett film to be destroyed on arrival. It never even made the
processing lab." Neil Davis, in Australia on leave in 1967, criticised ABC
censorship in an interview granted to the ABC in Melbourne. The News Editor
of the ABC in Sydney rebutted Davis. The Australian ran with the story and
exposed the machinations of censorship in the 'free' Australian media. 25
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3.

The Lon Nol Period (1970-75)

The Neil Davis-ABC management confrontation over censorship was
symptomatic of wider developments both inside Australian society and at the
cutting edge of the war itself. In Vietnam the Western press corps by the late
1960s were highly cynical of the official line - whether from government or
military level. Many came to adopt a position of open hostility to the American
war effort. The widening of Vietnam' s ground war into neutral Cambodia in
1970 was greeted by the Saigon press corps with incredulity. Many of them
packed their bags and shifted to Phnom Penh to cover a new stage of a war they
thought was winding down after 'Vietnamisation' signalled the American ground
withdrawal some months before.
The coup which overthrew Prince Sihanouk in March 1970 and the US/ARYN
land invasion in May 1970 put Cambodia squarely into the international
spotlight. Western journalists flooded into Phnom Penh to cover what would be
a five year civil war. Apart froll},Davis, other Australian journalists to grace the
Hotel Royale in this period included many who were prominent in Australian
media and political circles like Bruce Grant, Creighton Burns, Neil Jillett,
Michael Richardson, Peter Hastings, Tony Joyce, John Pennington, Richard
Carlton, Peter Couchman, Pat Burgess, Richard Palfreyman, Denis Warner,
David Jenkins, Neil Kelly, John Pilger and Allan Dawson.26
But news coverage from Cambodia in this period is best remembered by the
camera work of Neil Davis, .later immortalised on the David Bradbury
documentary Frontline. Davis biographer Tim Bowden argued during this period
Davis achieved "the most graphic combat footage of his career". 21 Indeed,
Cambodian news coverage wa� often a more hazardous terrain than Vietnam.
The battle lines were seldom clear and erupted unexpectedly from behind civilian
lines. Tim Bowden noted that most newsmen covering the action in Cambodia
were wounded more than once. 28 In October 1974 Davis himself wrote a
despatch for the Far Eastern':,Economic Review where he noted that nine
pressmen had been killed up to that time in the Cambodia war and that twenty
two foreign pressmen were missing. 29

JO

Bowden claims Davis maintained his political: neutrality throughout his
Cambodia encounters. But Davis reputedly picked up.a weapon on one occasion
to help defend a Cambodian government (Lon Nol ¥JTIY) position that was about
to be overrun because he knew "few reporters suryived capture by the Khmer
Rouge" as "prisoners were seldom taken."30 Later::;0n in the Davis biography
Bowden recounts how Davis attempted to suppress·this story when on leave in
Australia, denying its authenticity to enquiring local journalists.
Bowden excuses Davis here with the comment that iPDavis felt he was perceived
as less than impartial back in Cambodia it could jeopardise his future mobility to
report the war. But after Davis' death in Bangkok in the mid - 1980s, Bowden
ventured to the Thai border camp and interviewed former Lon Nol military
strongman, now leader of the anti-communist KPNLF, one General Dien Diel.
In his article for The Australian on the meeting, Bowden acknowledged
uncritically General Diel's claim that Davis was a close supporter of the
KPNLF's political program and the friendship between the two stretched back to
the Lon Nol days.3 1
Ironically, given this retrospective revelation about the possible political
allegiances of Neil Davis, it was the political Lef�and not the anticommunist
lobby in Australia who benefited most from the popularising the memory of the
heroic camera work of Neil Davis during the Indochina wars. While Bradbury's
Frontline backed up the claim to neutrality, the decision of Davis to cover the
wars with ARYN and Lon Nol troops was construed·in Australia as confirmation
that it was "their war" and not that of the Americans and the Australian junior
partner. The respect that Davis expressed for the tenacity of the defeated armies
of the ARYN and Lon Nol regime stood in contrast to his cynical view of the
American reliance on military technology. It was a view that reinforced the Left
argument that the locals were pawns of the Americans.
Even more significant was Bowden's claim that Davis maintained a healthy
respect for the Vietcong in Vietnam even though he travelled with their
opponents the ARYN in the battlefield. As noted above, it was not a respect that
extended to their communist comrades in neighbouring Cambodia.32 This may
not be so surprising given that Davis was not covering Vietnam during early
1 975 routing of the ARYN' s positions when the NVA - led assault generated a
massive civilian panic and a hostile Western press over the high casualty rate.
Instead Davis was in Phnom Penh witnessing similar violence from inside the
besieged city.

II

As the Khmer Rouge encircled Phnom Penh in early 1 975 they mounted a
general rocket attack on the city. Davis filmed one of the most horrific incidents
- a direct hit on a school on 6 February 1975. He agonised whether to film or help
with the bodies, "I felt revulsion and anger against the Communists. At the same
time I knew I must cover this story to get the best possible stark and bloody film,
to show exactly what the people of Cambodia had to put up with. After the war
ended, it became apparent that the Khmer Rouge were the most repressive and
bloody regime of recent times, so it wasn't surprising in retrospect that they did
what they did before the end of the war."33
With more than a touch of irony, Davis met two of Australia's opposition
politicians Andrew Peacock and Ian Sinclair after they had flown into Phnom
Penh on I April 1975 on a 'fact finding mission' . Peacock used his influence
with the Americans to assist Davis in flying out of Phnom Penh just days before
the collapse and the beginning of Democratic Kampuchea. 34 Davis went on to
make history, returning to Saigon in time to film the first NVA tank crashing
through the gates of the Presidential Palace, the symbolic event that signalling
the final end of the Vietnam War.

..
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4.

The Democratic Kampuchea Period
(1 975-78)

The fall of Phnom Penh to the Khmer Rouge in April .) 975 marked a new period
of closure as far as Western media coverage of Cambodia was concerned. It
marked also a qualitative shift in tone of what news was despatched about the
war torn country. The horrors of war became the horrors of 'genocide'. A recent
film documentary3' revealed there was a concerted campaign by key leading
newspapers of the Western world to saddle up the new Democratic Kampuchea
regime with labels like 'bloodbath', 'genocide' and 'one million executions' well
in advance of any substantial evidence to support such claims. Henry Kissinger,
the architect of the massive US bombing of Cambodia, was quoted in The Age as
deriding the 'genocide' inside Cambodia just days after the Khmer Rouge
victory. 36
The Western media elites, primarily through the news flow of the international
wire services, invoked an 'atrocity' syndrome whenever reference was made to
the new Democratic Kampuchea regime. This campaign was based on little
proven collaborated evidence at that stage. Reductionist speculation and
stereotypical journalism became the norm of what was at best scanty reporting.
Democratic Kampuchea chose to ignore Western public opinion to its own
detriment. 37 Two texts based on interviews with Khmer refugees leaving
Democratic Kampuchea for the Thai border refugee camps over the following
eighteen months achieved notoriety in this regard. They were the John Barron
and Anthony Paul's Murder ofa Gentle People which found a global circulation
through Reader's Digest magazine and the French priest, Father Ponchaud, with
his Cambodia Year Zero. Both books, based extensively on refugee testimonies,
were reviewed widely in the Western press. Their mass circulation ensured the
status of the definitive standard reference texts on Democratic Kampuchea's
gross violations of human rights. The Australian based academic, Michael
Vickery, later coined the phrase "Standard Total View" (of Cambodia) to
describe the emergence of this media orthodoxy.
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The fall of Phnom Penh was recorded by a number of Western journalists who
had remained behind in the French Embassy after 17 April, 1975 collapse of the
Lon Nol regime. The escapades of these journalists later became immortalised in
the popular memory by the 1984 Hollywood film The Killing Fields. The docu
drama style of this Hollywood production was problematic. On the surface its
dominant theme, the heroism of the Western journalists versus the despotic and
faceless Third World Asian dictators, coincided too neatly with Hollywood's
other mythical post-war celluloid reconstructions of Indochina to totally measure
up to its claim to 'truth'. But Academy awards and 'real life' characters from the
scripted story were powerful enough to override any serious academic criticism
of what was in many ways an Orientalist and racist soap opera.
Thus the reconstruction of history through Hollywood's The Killing Fields
became canonised as the official documentary history of the fall/liberation of
Phnom Penh. Producer David Puttnam claimed his film was true to the original
Sydney Schanberg storyline. The problem for historians today is deciding how
much of the fragments offered by the Western journalist storyline - from
correspondents like Sydney Sohanberg and John Swain - can safely claim the
status of authenticity, presenting the 'whole picture', or even part truth, from
what was the turmoil and maelstrom of revolution in Cambodia April 1975.
The New York Times correspondent, Sydney Schanberg, and The Times
(London) correspondent, John Swain, emerged later as the most prolific of the
bewildered bevy of journalists arriving by road at the Thai border in early May
1975 after being expelled from the French Embassy compound by the new
regime. Within hours of reaching Thailand, the syndicated articles on the capture
of Phnom Penh, written by journalists like Swain and Schanberg were widely
republished in the overseas and Australian press.38 Their accounts, based as they
were on rumours about the evacuation of the capital and some observations of
the countryside during their dash for the border, were validated retrospectively
by the 1984 release of The Killing Fields which retold their story from their own
vantage position.
The Schanberg/Swain view of the new Democratic Kampuchea regime as it
appeared in the Australian press was highly critical. They speculated that the
takeover of Phnom Penh and i,ts subsequent evacuation was in all likelihood a
'bloodbath'. More cautious and sceptical accounts from the American freelancer
Richard Boyle and the Australian academics Shane and Chou Meng Tarr were
ignored by the Western media. 39 This was despite the fact these people had at
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least experienced the new Cambodia from outside the French Embassy. Yet
Schanberg and Swain, compiling their syndicated reports from inside the French
Embassy, were credited as the only Western witnesses to the rustification of
Cambodia.
As the Englishman John Swain flew into Phnom Peilh from Bangkok on the last
flight to land in before the Khmer Rouge took over, 40 Neil Davis was flying out
to Bangkok. Davis briefly re-entered Cambodia from the Thai border to film the
Khmer Rouge taking Poipet on 19 April. He wasihen bundled back over the
border into Thailand. 4 1 From the Thai border Davis departed the growing
contingent of journalists gathering there and slipped back into Vietnam to record
the fall of Saigon on 30 April 1 975.42 Meanwhile the Thai border emerged as a
key listening post for news from inside the new Democratic Kampuchea. Initially
some journalists crossed over to see for themselves. As the border became sealed
it was a case of relying on reports from escaping refugees and monitoring Khmer
Rouge radio. The entourage from the French Embassy emerged to a huge media
fanfare in early May 1975 with heroic tales of their daring deeds to be lapped up
by a global media.
Joining these ranks at the end of his appointmeiit to Beijing was the ABC
journalist Paul Raffaele. Raffaele's report, when 'viewed in retrospect typified
what became the 'Standard Total View' on Cambodia reporting. His assertion as
to the trail-blazing nature of his brief trip inside Democratic Kampuchea bears
the familiar imprint of a war correspondent in sear1>h of the dangerous mission.
Headed "Do you know the penalty for this crime?" the radio report was broadcast
on the ABC's Correspondents Report July 1975.43 A written version appeared six
years later in the anthology Then and Now: ABC Correspondents Abroad.
Raffaele claimed, "I broadcast my findings on ABC news and current affairs
radio in Australia - and shortly afterwards heard Prince Norodom Sihanouk
denouncing me by name on Radio Phnom Penh. The world press took up the
story, swarming into the Thai border area with Kampuchea to seek out the gory
details of Pol Pot's version of the 'Final Solution'." 44
Raffaele positions himself on the Thai side of the Kampuchea border near
Aranyaprathet, "weighing up the likelihood of surviving to tell the story" should
he breach the Khmer Rouge border patrol.45 Armed with a valid Peking press
card, Raffaele scrambles over the barb wire with a Thai translator in tow to
become "the first Western journalist to set foot back in Kampuchea". He was
confronted by soldiers who were all "about sixteen or seventeen", yet still
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"seasoned fighters". They were the same ones that "swarmed into Phnom Penh".
Next their superior arrives and accuses Raffaele of "violating the security of our
border". Then Raffaele conducts an interview with "the first senior Khmer
Rouge official to talk to a Western correspondent since the takeover in Phnom
Penh." 46
In the Introduction Furlonger noted the impossibility of publishing or even
retaining the huge volume of despatches that arrive from overseas to the ABC.
Thus the book "pays only inadequate tribute to the correspondents who have kept
Australians aware of what is going on in an often remote world." The book is
dedicated to "the many men and women whose bravery and suffering provided
(the younger generation of journalists) with at least some semblance of a
heritage-however imperfect." 47
Raffaele states "... He was guarded and his replies were often deliberately vague;
but he did confirm that the cities had been abandoned in a bid to force the people
to adopt a primitive rural socialism. He went on to admit that education had been
suspended, that families were J:>eing split up, and that an unknown number of
'class enemies and agents of imperialism' had been put to death."48 The interview
apparently ends with the military commander of the Khmer Rouge western
border division berating Raffaele, "You should not come into Kampuchea! We
do not want your corrupt capiurlist kind here! That is why we expelled all the
others! You broke our law by coming into Kampuchea illegally! This time we
will let you go because of our friendship with China! If there is a next time - we
49
will kill you!"
Maybe the ABC's editor did not wish to detract from his journalist's scoop with
its emphasis on the perilous nature of his correspondent's journey.50 However,
even two years later, in 1 977, that is as late as two years after the border closure,
Australian freelance cameraman, Walter Burgess, working for Visnews, made
three trips into so-called impenetrable Cambodia from different starting points
along the Thai border side. Travelling with the right-wing Khmer Serai, Burgess
penetrated between eight to thirty kilometres into the countryside. He shot film
of canal diggings, villages, mines, and rotting bodies. 51
The Raffaele story also recounts how "several" western yachtsmen, blown off
course, were taken to Phnom Penh, "tortured and killed".52 But the final written
edition of the Raffaele story fails to edit "several" yachtsmen down to "two"
yachtsmen to make it historically accurate. This would appear imperative. The
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incident had not even occurred in July 1975. Its inclusion in the 1981 printed
edition suggests additions were made to the original Raffaele radio despatch to
embellish it. Presumably, such additions were inserted by Furlonger, the book's
editor. If so, did not Furlonger have a responsibility to make those additions as
accurate as the contemporaneous record allowed? In.deed, the 1981 publication
date fell after the date the Australian press first headlined the story of the missing
Australian yachtsmen captured by the Khmer Rouge. Otherwise why tamper at
all with the 1975 despatch?
A similar objection arises over the Raffaele story being loaded up with the
familiar cliches and expressions that punctuated other anti-DK reporting in the
1977-80 period in the works of John Pilger, Barrqn/Paul and Ponchaud. The
Raffaele story recounts events with a depth of knowledge that had not entered the
established record at the time of his reporting. Examples abound, such as,
" ... Mercilessly, these 'children of the revolution' swept Phnom Penh and
Kampuchea's other cities clean of people, forcing them at gun-point out into the
countryside. The ill and the dying were dragged from their hospital beds and
made to march or to crawl along with the other hundreds of thousands of terrified
men, women and children on their way to the new 'socialist reality'.
... Those who collapsed by the wayside were disposed of. The lucky ones were
bayoneted or shot. The majority were dragged into the bush and bashed to
death with hoes and shovels. Those who survived were forced to hack new
villages out ofthejungle, living on starvation rations until the crops they had
just planted should be capable of harvesting. And when that occurred, they
still received only one small tin of rice per person, per day, provided they
behaved themselves ... The new Jerusalem became a gigantic chamel-house
as those who had served the previous government, those who had been
misguided enough to acquire an education ... were systematically tortured and
beaten to death in their hundreds of thousands. 53

We could ask where Raffaele get all this information just two to three months
after 17 April 1975? He claims to have "spent my first few weeks at the border,
talking to many of the thousands of refugees streaming across from the new
Communist state." He claims he was "sceptical at first" but as the stories were
repeated "by new refugees pouring through more and more boltholes in the
border" he was "convinced of the truth of their horrifying tales."54 Whatever
stories Raffaele was able to glean in this brief interlude up to July 1975 on the
Thai border the reliability of the above account is more in keeping with an early
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1980s consensus than with the confusion and uncertainty of the first few months
after April 1975.
Like Raffaele, most US and UK sourced accounts of the early years of the DK
regime were characterised by unmitigated hostility of the Raffaele variety. The
Asian regional press was a little more circumspect and speculative. For example,
the respected regional weekly the Far East Economic Review gave a guarded, but
critical, overview of the first year of the DK rule in its 29 October 1976 edition.
It read, ''Throughout 1976, the KCP appeared to be capable of supporting those
people it chose to support at around subsistence level." The account added,
"... this was no mean achievement given that Washington estimated that one
million Cambodians would starve. Perhaps fewer than 25% of that number
actually starved in 1975-76".55
Given that inside Democratic Kampuchea was effectively sealed off from the
Western media between 1975-78, it was not surprising that many supporters of
the Indochinese revolutions remained unconvinced by the 'sour grapes' of the
vanquished superpower and its press minions epitomised by the wire services.
The mainstream Australian press generally followed the lead of AAP, Reuters
and AP news flow with its barrage of criticism on the new Democratic
Kampuchea regime. While stories like the Raffaele one were the norm there were
still sceptics in the West includ_ipg Australia.
A handful of the more serious researchers sought to establish the 'real truth' . The
method was to search for contradictions amongst the plethora of anti-Khmer
Rouge propaganda surfacing in the Western media. This belated defence of DK
was later referred to by scholar Micheal Vickery as 'the literature of denial'. It
was the reverse side of the prejudicial press distortions. In Australia, the
Cambodianist academic Ben Kiernan exposed as fakes some press photos of an
alleged Khmer Rouge execution.of civilians. The photos were actually staged in
Thailand and then distributed to the foreign press in return for money. But his
exposure was found not in the offending daily press, which published and
republished the photos above a ronflicting array of captions, but in journals with
minusc ! �culation like the Melbourne Journal of Politics and News From
� ::
.
ost detailed sifting through of the Western press coverage of Democratic
p chea between the years · 1975-78 was performed by the noted American
scholar Noam Chomsky. In a detailed study called The Reconstruction of an
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Imperial Ideology: The Political Economy of Human Rights (Volume Two),

p�ed in early 1 979, he attempted to show that much of the media on
�emoc_ratic Kampuchea was little more than 'distqrtions at third hand' where
unreliable refugee accounts of atrocities had been l;lastily gleaned, unethically
extrapolated, and then repeatedly circulated, as t�
media's 'standard total
'
view'. 57
It was not until late 1 978 when US journalists Elizabeth Becker from the
Washington Post and Richard Dudman from the St Louis Despatch joined the
Dutch-born academic Malcolm Caldwell in a visit to Democratic Kampuchea
that the hope of an independent assessment from Western media observers
emerge. 58 But Caldwell' s assassination by unknown gunmen dampened this
hope. Becker and Dudman's reports in the US press were reprinted subsequently
in The ustralian but only as a backdrop to coverage of the Vietnamese invasion
w
had begun as the delegation departed Phnom Penh. Both journalists were
"tical of the human rights record of the DK regime, but Dudman confirmed that
Western news reports appeared to have been exaggerated for propaganda
purposes.59
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5.

The Post-Invasion Media Story (1 979-91 )

The Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea in 1979 occurred during the highpoint
of the Fraser led Liberal Government's geo-strategic orientation in foreign
policy. It was a period of heightened superpower rivalry between the US and the
USSR which climaxed with the invasion of Afghanistan and the rise of
Reaganism in the USA. To traditionalists on the Left and left liberal intellectual
circles it was the 'Second Cold War' In this period Vietnam was defined as a
pawn of the Soviet Union. Its invasion of Democratic Kampuchea was
confirmation to political conservatives of both the old 'Domino Theory' and th e
'Soviet thrust' into Asia. 61
.(,J)

Vietnam, while widely condemned by Western politicians and editorialists for its
invasion, was still considered by many in the West as the "acceptable face of
Asian communism". This was because the alternative, a continuation of
Democratic Kampuchea under Pol Pot, was perceived as a darker option. Left
opinion was initially divided . . Academic Gavan McCormack appraised the
relative merits of the defence c'ase for Democratic Kampuchea in the Melbourne
intellectual journal Arena, under the heading 'The Problem of Knowing the
Truth".62 In summary, he condemned the human rights record of the DK but
conceded the advent of black propaganda spread by the invading Vietnamese
probably ensured a clean weighing up of the evidence over the 1 975-78 years
would now be more difficult.
But the issue was cloudy for the..strategically-minded media analysts as well. The
choice between two evils (DK and Hanoi) found more than a few accepting that
Vietnam could become a bulwark against a resurgent Killing Fields. This
uncertainty Jed to what Cambodia Watching called 'elite ambivalence' in
Australia's media institutions. there was a clear proprietorial division over what
was to be the correct response to the rights and wrongs of both the Vietnamese
'invasion' and the Pol Pot 'genocide' .63 Hard-liners saw the issue in terms of
East-West Bloc politics. But an increasing number of print media commentators
- foreign affairs journalists and Jeadin� academics - switched from rbeic 'antj.,
commynism' premise of the earlier Vietnam War days to a new 'understandlng'
of Hanoi's geo-strategic move into Kampuchea. \
r-
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Such a turn around, increasingly reflected in editorial positioning throughout the
1980s as the PRK position became more secure, owing its initial success to the
new information brokers of the Cambodia cQntlict the aid workers, the
documentary filmmakers, the academic Cambodian specialists and selected
journalists - most of whom reinforced a "New Stl!Jldard Consensus". The key
aspect of which was to play down the shortfall of Vietnam's protegees in Phnom
Penh, lest public criticism contribute to a resurgence of the Khmer Rouge. They
filtered the news in a way that presented the Phnom Penh authorities (PRK/SOC)
as a variant of Western liberalism while the opposing factions in the Resistance
(DK/CGDK/NGC) were depicted as savages, uncivilised, terrorists, murderers,
Hitlerites, etc. Undoubtedly, the appalling track record in human rights of the DK
regime made this task much simpler.
A leading player here was the Australian expatriate and high profile journalist
John Pilger. He was one of the first Western ·ournalists allowed into the
·
Vietnamese controlled Kam uchea in mid- 1979, ostens1
the UK
base
am. rom this visit Pil er filme
inv · n as e coun ay m waste as a result of thewar that had djsrupted crop
planting and also precipitated massive mobilisation and dislocation of the people.
In his widely acclaimed documentary, Cambodia Year 'Zero, Pilger sheeted home
orld
the entire blame onto the Khmer Rouge:-Cambodza Year Z Ti
was a propaganda coup or t e P K and the Vietnaroe�e.�
The relative inertia of the press in reporting the DK years was now compensated
for in 1979 by massive press exposure through wire service photos of The Killing
Fields. Positive as this development was in redressing the balance of the previous
years it was still liable to ideological distortion. The new lexicology of "Pol Pot
regime", "genocidal maniac", "irreversibility" and "comprehensive settlement"
sprung up in the media as an impediment to serious analysis from any side.
Sloganeering replaced debate as the much needed aid deliveries to Cambodia and
the refugees on the Thai border became a media centre-piece in the controversy
over the morality of invasion versus the morality of human rights abuses.64
In late 1979 the Melbourne Herald serialised Pilger's "Asian Holocaust" spread
from his London Daily Mirror expose. Before long the 'Pilger effect' of
';P1'Sading journalism meant all news reports on the Cambodia war from
_/Bangkok, Singapore, Phnom Penh or even Australia were obliged to lead with
reductionist commentary as "responsible for the deaths of over one million
people" within .the leading paragraphs. Politically, however, this shock
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journalism was not standardised until the more 'middle-of-the-road' journalists
like Micheal Richardson adopted it. A pile of skulls graphic adorned his mid1980 front page report for the Melbourne Age. The Age editorialised in favour of
Australia's de-recognition of the DK Government at the UN General Assembly
vote in the same issue. Pressure mounted with Pilger's Cambodia: Year One
screened towards the end of 1980. It claimed the Cambodians were suffering
because of the Western diplomatic logjam preventing humanitarian aid reaching
the people.
The Cambodia debate in Australia coincided chronologically with the Liberal
Party leadership struggle between Andrew Peacock and Malcolm Fraser. In
February 1981 the leadership issue came to a head as Peacock resigned the
Foreign Ministry over a policy difference with Fraser on Cambodian 'de
recognition'. Peacock had earlier chosen on the high rating 60 Minutes current
affairs television program to launch 'a frontal attack on Fraser over Cambodia.
Peacock forced Fraser's hand and delivered Australia's Cambodian policy up to
the pro-Phnom Penh lobby. Fraser's geo-strategic viewpoint was now 'on the
nose' as far as the media was concerned. The Cambodia policy was now driven
by the domestic media's revulsion against the Khmer Rouge human rights abuses
and not by Prime Ministerial and Cabinet solidarity with the US and ASEAN
vision of regional security.
•

·IJi°

But the United Nations sponsored International Conference on Kampuchea in
late 1981, Vietnam boycotted, and the ASEAN-sponsored formation of the
Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea in June 1982 which gave the
DK a veneer of respectability that the pro-Phnom Penh media lobby found hard
to dislodge. As media academic Rod Tiffen noted:
... Since the Australian government announced its derecognition of Pol Pot,
the news coverage about Ka_mpuchea has been accurate in detail but
misleading in drift. Most reporting about Kampuchea has been centred on the
reponing of official statements and diplomatic actions of countries opposed
to Vietnam, seeking its withdrawal from Kampuchea! Despite editorial
stances to the contrary, we have had neutral reponing of these diplomatic and
political initiatives with little irulication not only that they lack reality, but that
if they were effective in removing Vietnam from Kampuchea, they would
increase the instability of Kampuchea and the misery of its people. The result
has been the accurate reponing of diplomatic fictions. This is a dilemma for
the press and one that shows it9 vulnerability. 65
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Tiffen here shows one side of the complexity of reporting Cambodia during the
1 980s, when the on-going war cost well over a hundred thousand military and
civilian casualties, but because it didn't match the �cale of destruction and loss
of human life of the 'Pol Pot period' it remained poorly reported.<"' In short, there
were either other more pressing international ca:!,amities or the media had
relegated the issue to the backburner. The noted English journalist William
Shawcross toured Australia later and contextualised this as Western 'compassion
fatigue' and 'political amnesia' where global crises are news today gone
,
tomorrow.
On the other hand, Cambodia had remained as a centre-piece or a 'pawn' of
global and regional diplomacy at a time of massive.:shifts and challenges in the
international power balances in the mid- 1 980s. Hence reporting of diplomatic
initiatives, and inter alia 'diplomatic fictions', reflected both the posturing of
great powers in the media and the sensitivity between the Khmer belligerents
over the nuances of any settlement terms. 67 (Often the argument was about
seating arrangements at conferences!). It was a sensitivity that the specialist
journalists pursued with professional skill but was largely lost on the editors, sub
editors and general public with their desire for easy solutions. Similarly, the
diplomatic response to the 'Cambodia problem' often underpinned trade offs in
a host of other bilateral areas. For example, Australia's high profile on
Cambodia, as far as Indonesia was concerned, was predicated on our soft
pedalling the East Timor issue. Again the subtleties escaped the quick-fix school
of journalism.68
The desire for simple answers partially explains the success of people like John
Pilger who could reduce everything into a sequence of television frames and
emotive pleas so that the public 'understood' . But his presentation of the issues
to a viewing or reading audience in a 'black or white' manner, without any shades
of grey, soon led Pilger' s critics to cry foul and accuse him of promoting
'diplomatic fictions' as well. The leading Pilger critic in Australia was the
conservative commentator Gerard Henderson. In a typical anti-Pilger press
commentary Henderson picked up on the British press attack on Pilger's
Cambodia Year II: The Betrayal.69 Henderson challenges what he called the
Pilger conspiracy theory where, "Such a complicated scenario (as Cambodia)
lends itself easily to conspiracy theories, at which John Pilger excels - witness
his claim that a 'trinity' comprising "Pol Pot, Washington and Peking - assisted
by the likes of Singapore, Britain and (apparently) Australia - is taking ill defined
actions which will see the Khmer Rouge restored to power." 70
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The only point of agreement between the Pilger and Henderson camps was over
Foreign Minister Hayden's 1986 proposal for a Genocide Tribunal which was
pushed heavily in the media by academics and aid workers to bring Pol Pot to an
international court for 'genocide'. But even here the Henderson camp sought to
tar the Phnom Penh authorities (many of whom were ex-Khmer Rouge) with the
same brush. The media high point of this 'genocide' debate was in the 1987-88
period when Hayden's successor Senator Evans refused to succumb to Australia
pushing the initiative. Evans had reservations that were partly technical, partly
hypocritical - a desire to appease ASEAN, particularly Indonesia over East
Timor, and an unwillingness to totally surrender the Khmer Rouge card to Hanoi
and the PRK except in the context of a full settlement of the Cambodia issue.71
The Evans peace plan, in the wake of the Vietnamese withdrawal in September
1989, required a further tactical retreat on the Genocide Tribunal issue, if only to
bring the Khmer Rouge faction into the peace plan. This plan saw a further
redefining of the media's elite consensus as now Evans was obliged to defend his
imaginative peace plan against Pilger and others who argued it was a 'Trojan
Horse' for the Khmer Rouge regaining power. Evans sought to use diplomacy to
engineer simultaneously a pro-US, pro-PRK solution that required constant fine
tuning. Otherwise media attention was deflected away from history and reality
(the on-going ground war) towards diplomacy media-speak.72
· fc

The media greeted the UN peace plan with mild euphoria, as did Canberra's
public relations mill. Attention switched to a threatened military re-emergence of
the Khmer Rouge. As this threat intensified in the media the Vietnamese and
PRK dug in and quibbled over the fine points of the peace plan tha� would foist
power sharing with erstwhile enemies upon them.
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6.

The UN Cambodia Peace Plan (1 990-93)

a)

Press Optimism on the Cambodian Peace Plan

As noted in the earlier section the media coverage of the Cambodian war centred
more on the endless round of international diplomatic meetings aimed at
reaching a negotiated solution. From the international conference in Paris held in
August 1989 the Western media contingent that followed these talks became a
key player. They relished the opening up of Cambodia to outsiders when the
Paris Conference despatched an interim UN military inspection mission to
Cambodia and the border camps under the Norwegian General Vadset.
Sympathetic coverage of the Phnom Penh administration during this mission set
a precedent that ensured the massive Western press contingent was allowed into
Cambodia to 'monitor' the official 'final' Vietnamese troop withdrawal at the
end of October 1 989.
The international press were satisfied the Vietname� troops had fully withdrawn
but the Khmer Rouge and other resistance factions still insisted on UN
verification. Not surprisingly, when the Khmer Rouge made 'significant military
gains' after the withdrawal date there was a "backlash in the West" where there
was "waning political support" for the resistance .�rmies. Far East Economic
Review journalist Nate Thayer maintained the Khmer Rouge, in particular had
" that
always faced a "vocal rather cacophonic rejection of an develo
the
es ern o sition "
assisted the'
exten o sympathy that continues
exist for the Khmer Rouge an<Ltheir
programs" anEl this unacknowledged tact would result in an undermining of the
"prospeets fo1 a wmkable, Sustamed solut n". ,:,-

Ifone wanted to find evidence of press coverage designed to isolate the Khmer

Rouge and drive them away from the peace table it would be hard to surpass the
Australian press in this period. The diplomatically reached solution in Cambodia
was generally celebrated, and Australian journalists persisted with their dual
theme of alienating and vilifying the Khmer Rouge faction as much as possible.
The peace talks at Pattaya in July and August 199 1 bringing the four Khmer
factions together were a case in point.
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The meetings themselves were greeted optimistically by the Australian press.74
But coverage of the talks in Australia continually ignored presenting any analysis
of the progress of the confidence building measures aimed at achieving a
workable solution. Instead the 'Pol Pot factor' was used to dress up what was
otherwise rather thin copy. Sam Lipski in The Bulletin devoted almost an entire
page length column in the national weekly to a rumour that Pol Pot was in
Pattaya, only to conclude, that even if the rumour was "totally erroneous", it still
showed "US intelligence sources" were worried that the "Khmer Rouge remain
strongly in the picture."75 The Age correspondent Lindsay Murdoch, reporting on
the second round of talks in August, continued this media obsession with Pol
Pot's whereabouts. His despatch "Reporters hunt for mysterious Pol Pot"76 was
given the same prominence as the much more immediate and serious issue "Hun
Sen to clash with US over peace plan."77
The alternative issue, optimism over the prospect of peace, gained even greater
media prominence following the 'Perm 5' (UN Security Council) meeting
endorsing the progress of the Khmer factions. The Telegraph Mirror reported
"Peace for Cambodia" and "'The war is over- Sihanouk"'.78 Less sensational was
the Sydney Morning Herald 79 ·with "Peace talks end on hopeful note" and an
editorial, "Sowing peace in the killing fields", where it was suggested the Phnom
Penh Government was moving away from its hardline position of objecting to
KR participation in the election process.8() The Age editorial, "Welcome progress
on Cambodia", was optimistic lnd endorsed the Evans proposal with:
Proponents of the plan believe that involving Pol Pot 's organisation in
peaceful avenues ofchange is the only way to prevent a return to the years of
bloodshed. So far so promising ... Senator Evans has been persistent in
following through the initiative that the UN took as the basisfor its proposal.
He uses the phrase "niche diplomacy " to describe the task and Canberra 's
role. Khieu Samphan sees a lasting ceasefire ... as dependent on a UN
monitoring force. 81
The Australian 's editorial, "Playing our part in ending a nightmare", on the New
York UN General Assembly ,meeting in September 199 1 provided further
optimism82 It began, "The elimination of the final obstacles to the signing of a
settlement between the warring factions in Cambodia represents a victory for
quiet Australian diplomacy. Senator Evans's strength has been to refine the
methods of his predecessor (Hayden) and to work with our regional allies,
particularly Indonesia ... "83 The editorial concluded by noting a breakdown of
order in Cambodia that may endanger our troops, but added we should have the
"strength of our convictions" to ensure the peace plan is kept.84
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The Weekend Australian ran a commentary by Bangkok-based British journalist
James Pringle, reporting from Phnom Penh, following the signing of the Paris
Accords in late October 1 991.85 Pringle reported "cautious optimism" under the
heading "Phnom Penh awaits new peace". He noted the widespread availability
of guns in the capital and the fragile peace as the .Cambodian masses awaited
Prince Sihanouk's promised return. He added the t�king down of Ho Chi Minh
and Lenin portraits was "a symbol, perhaps, of an old order passing." Alan
Boyd's despatch, "Treaty marks the beginning of the end of Asia's cold war",
reported optimism from Hanoi where "Western diplomats say the breakthrough
(in Cambodia) is expected to spark a flurry of activity by Vietnam which is
anxious to heal the rift from the war with its suspicious neighbours." 86
In the wake of the UN decision, The Bulletin 's Laurie Oakes praised Senator
Evans and his department as "Deserving of praise".87 Oakes criticised Liberal
Opposition Foreign Affairs spokesman Robert Hill for his claim in July 1 990 that
"any comprehensive settlement involving a role for the Khmer Rouge was really
not going to succeed." Oakes noted Hun Sen was to visit Australia "in
recognition of our contribution". Yet there is an "extraordinary reluctance" on
the part of the media and the Opposition to acknowledge this achievement.
Oakes argued there was something in (the Evans plan) for "everyone except the
Khmer Rouge." Even China would want to restore its international image in a
post-Tienanmen era by " weaning themselves off overt support for Pol Pot".88
In a move that won much applause from the Australian media and perhaps
bloated the importance of journalists and politicians alike, Senator Evans
persuaded the PRK/SOC's Prime Minister Mr Hun Sen to visit Australia before
returning to Cambodia from Paris. The tour was a diplomatic success for both the
Hun Sen faction and Senator Evans. On 27 October , Bruce Jones in his Extra
column in the Sun-Herald claimed "Australia rescues a nation in turmoil" in a
whole page of glowing commentary to Hun Sen and his chaperone Senator
Evans.89 Greg Sheridan was equally praiseworthy in The Australian where his
article was headed (Senator Evans) "Midwife to a fragile Cambodian peace".89
Nobody in the media even remotely suggested that Australia might be
compromised in the eyes of the other Khmer factions."°
At the same time the advanced contingent of Australian Peace Keeping Force
troops were being readied to be sent to Cambodia. The day after Hun Sen arrived
in Australia the Sydney Morning Herald Defence Correspondent Greg Austin
informed "Aust troops for Cambodia told they won't have to fight."91 The report
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carried a photo of Hun Sen and Evans, smiling side by side, during a joint press
conference in Canberra. Hun Sen, captioned in the photo "The Cambodian Prime
Minister" was more accurately referred to in the body of the article as "a member
of Cambodia's Supreme National Council which includes representatives of the
Phnom Penh Government and the three resistance factions".
The Austin article noted that Hun Sen assured Evans "that Australian troops
would not get bogged down in any military quagmire" thus implying Hun Sen
had sufficient control of the countryside to enforce such an undertaking. Austin
noted a convergence of interests with his observation "Mr Hun Sen and Senator
Evans debunked press speculation that the Khmer Rouge was still a strong force
that could scuttle the peace plan". As columnist Frank Devine later revealed in
The Australian the Hun Sen visit was arranged to shore up the credibility of the
Evans Peace Plan and assuage public concern over the safety of Australian troops
in their Peace Keeping role in Cambodia.92
Implied in Hun Sen's comments was a guarantee that the Khmer Rouge would
be nobbled under the Evans Plan. The Sydney Sun-Herald in late December
199 1 provided further evidence. A number of academic supporters of Hun Sen
indicated a switch from the Pilger hard-line view over to the Evans camp. Keith
Gosman's article noted, "in a disastrous year for the Federal Government, the
Foreign Minister's Cambodia initiative has gained Australia precious prestige in
the international arena." Dr Adrian Vickers claimed Evans had won "an immense
amount of respect" in the region. Dr Gary Klintworth, slightly more guarded,
said, "although he didn't agree with the entire thrust of Senator Evans proposal
(he) would not take anything away from him". Dr Stuart Fox gives the original
impetus to Bill Hayden, but adds a "full marks" to Senator Evans. All three
academics alleged the Khmer Rouge signed the agreement because of their
"military weakness". Gosman warned the Khmer Rouge may still "spoil the
Senator's diplomatic tea party" as Hun Sen's administration with its
"considerable Western support, not the least from Australia" faced protests in
Phnom Penh over "widespread and notorious corruption" wherein "the
imposition of external solution� remains, as always, a part of the problem."93
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(b) Sihanouk's Return to Phnom Penh November December 1 991
After years of debunking Sihanouk for his refusal �o be pinned down to a fixed
diplomatic position the Australian press begruqgingly acknowledged the
powerful symbolic role his return to Phnom Penh played in the peace process.
The Sydney Morning Herald editorial "Cambodia's Next Experiment" claimed
Sihanouk's return marked "the end of Cambodia's long nightmare of death and
destruction punctuated in the late 1 970s only by a genocidal attempt at social
experimentation." It also marked "a radical experiment" by the UN where "UN
peace keeping forces will monitor the cease-fire and disarm the belligerents. UN
administrators will run Cambodia's internal affai-rs until elections are held in
1993 and then oversee the transfer of power to a new government". It concluded,
"Sometimes it is necessary to take a calculated leap into the unknown. This is one
of those occasions."95
94

Under the heading, "Return of the Profligate Son", Lindsay Murdoch, posed the
question "Can a hon vivant who has spent the past 13 years in cosseted exile
rescue a country devastated by war, disease and poverty?" This was the cover
feature December issue of the Good Weekend Mag�ine circulated with both the
Sydney Morning Herald and The Age. Significantly, the article reported that the
return of the first of the Khmer Rouge officials to Phnom Penh had occurred
without incident. It noted the return of Khmer Rouge General Mao Sary from
Bangkok with a photo caption that ran, "Large nu�bers of police together with
poor communications initially minimised protests against the Khmer Rouge's
return".97
96

(c) The Khieu Samphan incident and the media
November 1 991
A Lindsay Murdoch article published the previous October, just two days before
Khieu Samphan was due to arrive in Phnom Penh, was entitled in the Sydney
Morning Herald as "Khmer Rouge puts damper on peace pact". It dismissed
Khmer Rouge security fears surrounding the return to Phnom Penh of Samphan
to take up his SNC role as an attempt to sabotage the implementation of the Paris
peace agreement. Murdoch argued that Samphan's fears of assassination would
"scuttle" the SNC meeting scheduled to be held soon after his scheduled arrival
in Phnom Penh. He concluded on the point, "Hun Sen refused a Khmer Rouge
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demand for a Vatican-like enclave, protected by UN soldiers.... They should rent
a villa and live in the city like anybody else, he said.'"'8
The next day, the Weekend Australian ran a more neutral heading, "Security
threat to Khmer return", in a report from Phnom Penh by James Pringle who
noted fears over security concerned not only the Khmer Rouge leaders but Prince
Sihanouk's entourage as well. The report confirmed that both parties had every
intention of taking up their SNC offices in Phnom Penh. Son Sen, a political
representative of the Khmer Rouge on the SNC, had already flown into Phnom
Penh and taken up residence in the faction's compound. It was reported there
were a few protestors outside but the event had passed without incident. •m
99

On 27 November, Khieu Samphan, the second D.K representative on the SNC,
flew into the capital. The cavalcade from the airport was greeted with a peaceful
student protest. However after arriving at the Khmer Rouge compound, a crowd
outside violently ransacked the building, beat up Khieu Samphan and attempted
to lynch him with a belt on the overhead light hanging. SBS-TV' s Dateline
program had their journalist �ark Carey on the spot. Reporting live via satellite
on the attack on Khieu Samphan, Carey's agitated voice and exciting dialogue
gave the impression that it was a spontaneous protest by a frenzied and enraged
crowd. Neither Carey, nor for that matter Paul Murphy anchoring the program
back in Sydney, could disguise.Jheir glee at the events. No doubt most of the SBS
viewers would also have felt that if Samphan and Son Sen were lynched then
they were only getting their 'just deserts'. In the heat of the moment obviously
the total derailing of the peace process was a secondary consideration by these
Australian journalists. 101
In the same vein, Lindsay Murdoch, reported on the incident, from Singapore,
for The Age on the following day under the heading "Khmer leaders attacked on
retum".102 He stated, "... Demonstrations against the return of the Khmer Rouge
began yesterday. Several thousands of students marched through the city
demanding the Khmer Rouge be evicted." He also claimed, "At Phnom Penh
airport thousands of people �creamed "Killer!" and "Traitor !" as the Khmer
Rouge leaders arrived from Bangkok." And after the compound was ransacked,
"The Cambodian Prime Minister, Mr Hun Sen, went to the house shortly after
Mr Khieu Samphan arrived to try to calm the mob and save the Khmer Rouge
leaders, who were trapped ... "�

30

Sue Downie reporting on Radio Australia the d�y after the attack threw a
different light on the event. She stated there was a lot of talk around the Phnom
Penh amongst Khmers that strongly suggested Hun Sen bore responsibility for
initiating the protest. She emphasized the danger !)f the entire peace process
being derailed. This view was backed up by a well researched article in The New
Yorker by Stan Sessor. 103 Sessor began by noting the �dominant media images,
... Foreign press photographers sent around the world two unforgettable
pictures: Khieu Samphan, a frightened white haired man of sixty, with blood
streaming down his face ... then wearing a helmet ... ending up in an
armoured personnel carrier of the Cambodian Army, and were taken to the
airport and put on a plane to Bangkok. They retumed to Phnom Penh a few
weeks later, this time carefully guarded by troops ofthe Hun Sen government.
Many publications wrote about the incident as a case of an enraged
population that couldn 't bear to see itsformer torturers retum.

Two days later The Sydney Morning Herald appeared with the editorial heading
"Samphan ran out of town again", which argued, "... No-one is suggesting
Wednesday's frenzied attempt to extract revenge on Mr. Samphan was planned.
B ut it could have been more carefully guarded against." 11" The same day The
Adelaide Advertiser ran an AFP wire report under the heading "Hun Sen regrets
attack". 10s In this report Hun Sen accepted "full responsibility" but claimed his
"personal intervention" had rescued Samphan. Further, Hun Sen was reported as
saying "the mob were enraged by memories of the Khmer Rouge killing of more
than one million people during their rule". Hun Sen also "denied reports that his
government had organised the protests or that it had sent agents to provoke the
violence."
Sessor, like Downie, was dubious as to Hun Sen's innocence as to the origin of
the protest. He suggested the international press were sucked in. He gave the
example of a Washington Post editorial, which, following the line of the
Australian press, argued, " ... Forgetting the past means forgetting the people who
were murdered. That is precisely what the Cambodian people are unable, and to
their credit, unwilling to do". Sessor notes that the Hun Sen government sought
to reinforce this impression. A Foreign Ministry official attempted to explain it
this way to him. Sessor conceded the Khmer Rouge were partially to blame by
not sending in fresh faces to represent themselves. Nevertheless, he concluded,
"While Cambodians had every justification for rising up in anger and attacking
the Khmer Rouge compound, the fact is that nothing in Cambodia happens
spontaneously." 11"'
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(d) UNTAC and Continued Fighting in 1 992
Reporting Cambodia (in early 1992) mainly centred on two issues - the ongoing
fighting between the Khmer factions and the decision to commit 500 Australian
soldiers for the UNTAC Mission. Press enthusiasm for the use of Australian
troops in a peace-keeping capacity in Cambodia remained high. The Daily
Telegraph Mirror ran the human interest line with "Women for War Zone" and
announced twenty women would be among the 500 strong peace keeping force
from Australia. Prime Minister Keating, was quoted in the same article saying,
"... The soldiers will not be used to enforce or impose peace in Cambodia. If we
conclude there is no longer a peace in Cambodia the Australian and other UN
forces will have to be withdrawn."io7
By March 1992, The Age foreign editor Mark Baker was more dubious. In an
article about the continuing arms build-up by the big powers in South East Asia
he referred somewhat cynically to the "ostensible outbreak of peace in
Cambodia".108 Perhaps he had been reading the regional press where Thailand's
leading paper the Bangkok Post reported, "UN officers allege Vietnam units still
in Cambodia" and anonymous "senior UN military officer" said "elite
Vietnamese units are still operating in Cambodia". UN sources estimate
"hundreds" disguised as Cambodian soldiers while the KR allege "thousands"...
even non-KR Khmers remain "d(?eply suspicious of Vietnam's claim that it has
withdrawn all its forces". Khi!u Samphan said last month "fighting would
continue until UN forces disarmed all the factions and verified the withdrawal of
Vietnamese troops".1w
In a series of articles for The Australian in April-May 1992, James Pringle
covered the logistics of UNTAC and the visit of United Nations Secretary
General (21 April 1992), positioning of Indonesian troops in Kompong Thom
(27 April 1992) and the first Si��ophon to Phnom Penh train journey since the
Peace Plan (23 May 1992). In the latter article he noted, "in their propaganda
broadcasts, the communist Khmer Rouge say there are still Vietnamese troops in
Cambodia, although they pleaded they were out in 1989 ." In a wire service report
the same day 110 General Sanderson reported delays in implementing the peace
program "including verification of the Cambodian ceasefire and the
demobilisation and cantonment of forces". No mention of verification of the
Vietnamese withdrawal issue w�s made. 1 1 1
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e) The Australian Parliamentary Debate Endorsement
of the Full UNTAC Comm itment (April 1 992)
In late March 1 992 the press offered some scepticism over the pending decision
to commit the bulk of Australia's forces to the UNTAC group. The issue was
fanned in the media by statements by various Liberal opposition spokespeople
questioning the government's alleged secrecy over the decision and the fact that
the peace agreement seemed to be coming unstuck on the ground. 1 1 2 The latter
view was supported by various reports emanating from Cambodia itself of
continued fighting between the Khmer factions. 1 1 3
The Sydney Morning Herald editorial "Before o,µr troops go to Cambodia",
maintained Australia was about to commit 500 troops to Cambodia as the peace
plan was "in serious danger of coming unstuck". Blaming the Khmer Rouge for
wounding Australia's Colonel Stuart in a helicopter attack, the Herald argued
responsibility for the ceasefire breakdown was more evenly distributed as
"warring factions" had a "patchy" record in observing the ceasefire. In Kompong
Thom, the fighting was between "Khmer Rouge guerillas and government
troops". The paper warned against "an open-ended involvement", concluding it
was "a bit too late to be backing out, but not too late to vent anxieties".' 14
Under the heading "Killing fields give no peace of mind" The Australian backed
up this fear of an open-ended commitment. The special Parliamentary debate
would have to provide answers to "some awkward questions about the nature of
the role the Australians will serve, and the dangers they will face", as the Khmer
Rouge remained a "malevolent force, recalcitrant to the last and having lost none
of its talent for pure old fashioned thuggery". It was concerned on how our forces
would change from peacekeepers to peace enforcers if the Khmer Rouge "turns
feral with the peace process in mid-stream". The paper endorsed the flexible line
adopted by the ALP, conceding, "the structure of unilateral forces are still
evolving", the UN operates in a "nebulous" zone between "peace settlement
negotiation and military enforcement" as, UN peacekeeping, by its nature, occurs
in an "ad hoc manner."1 15
The Canberra Times was somewhat neutral with "Australia sends 500 to
Cambodia". 11 6 The Financial Review stressed troop security with "Keating
pledges troops' safety". 11 7 The Age took a dimmer view "Peace in Cambodia may
yet bring battle at home", noting "Australia's diplomatic successes in Cambodia
have not translated well on the domestic front."1 1 8 The Sydney Morning Herald's
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"On into the killing fields", argued if the Liberal Opposition's "carping" prior to
the April 1, statement was "opportunism" as the ALP was alleging, then the ALP
Government was in turn guilty of having had prior to this date "too casual an
approach to details of our commitment". The Herald, reminded the ALP
Government had stressed troops were "pe ace-keepers and not peace-enforcers",
a distinction "much more reasonable here than in the killing fields themselves."
Keating stressed Australian troops were not going to Cambodia "to impose a
settlement" and we will withdraw them "if civil war breaks out again". The pape r
noted that if the "going gets tough" then "bipartisan political support for this
commitment will be crucial". 1 19
The Australian editorial on 3 April, "Treading warily in Cambodia", warned
"Were peacekeepers in Cambodia to become embroiled in combat, not only
would the intervention fail but the .UN would be weakened in its resolve." 120
Frank Devine's column in the 'op-ed' pages of The Australian argued, "why
send word ahead that our soldiers, if threatened, would not fight? To deprive
soldiers of bellicosity is to endanger them. To announce in advance that their
response to being attacked will be withdrawal, is to invite attack upon them."121
But Devine stops short of openingly advocating a full frontal attack on the
Khmer Rouge. He suggests that issue will be determined by resolution of the
much vaunted issue of"how deeply we really wish to be involved in Asia. Ankle
deep? Knee-deep? Deeper?" He restates this more formally with "Canberra's
apparent hedging of our Cambodia commitments is an indication of how
wrenching it is to step from cosy contemplation of enhanced trade into
confrontation with some of our visceral attitudes to Asia". 122

As the Khmer Rouge stalled, for various reasons, on accepting the UNTAC
implementation of the Paris Agreement on a troop cantonment, the ferocity of the
anti-Khmer Rouge propaganda reached a new height in Australia. Former
Liberal and Democrat politician Don Chipp, who was sponsored on a trip to
Vietnam and Cambodia in early April on behalf of the NGOs with the aim of
increasing Australia's aid donations to Indochina, argued in his column in the
Sydney Sunday Telegraph, written before his departure, and headed "Pol Pot
continues with the slaughter". Chipp took the moral high ground. He argued that
foreign policy was about "national interest and self-preservation" whose legacy
was endless "agony and suffering" because, whenever applied, results in "ends
justifies the means" selfishness, which in turn leads to some countries,
(Australia), with a normally higli "level of national morality", allying themselves
"to contemptible forces to protect their own interests temporarily".
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This introduction was Chipp's lead up to his deploring, "the sponsorship and
protection given to one of the most revolting creatures.ever to disgrace this planet
- Pol Pot, the imbecilic leader of the Communist Khmer Rouge in Cambodia."
Simplifying history, Chipp then apportioned blame for the Third Indochina War.
He argued Pol Pot was "supported in tum by the Ch�nese, the US, Australia and
the Thais." After he (Pol Pot) "tortured, maimed and killed between one and three
million of his own people he fled from the liberating Vietnamese army in 1979,
he has been given sanctuary by corrupt generals of Thailand ... (where) he is still
killing and maiming innocent villagers ...". 123

(f) The Press and Peacekeeping in the New World
Order?
After the Parliamentary debate coverage the media temporarily dropped the issue
of Cambodia except for some casual coverage of the positive side of Australian
peace keeping in Cambodia, the dangers of facing further flare ups, the dangers
and slowness of the mine demobilisation programs, the upsurge of internal
refugees from the renewed intensity of the fighting and the failure of the
promised UN development aid to arrive from donor countries. 1 24
However, the press were also laying the ideological groundwork for the
seemingly inevitable contingency that the UNTAC peacekeepers may have to
change into peace-enforcers at some future date. For backing up the Devine and
Chipp viewpoints was the more sophisticated argument of defence and strategic
specialist Gary Klintworth in The Australian in June 1 992. 125 Klintworth began
with, "Human misery in Bosnia-Herzegovina has made the previously
unthinkable quite thinkable: the idea that States can intervene, and may have a
right to do so, in the domestic affairs of other states, even to using military force
when the objective is clearly humanitarian. This shift in favour of a "right to
intervene" ranks among the most important consequences of the post-Cold War
attempt to establish a new world order."
Klintworth then reflected on how the New World Order would affect the
Cambodian situation with, " The dilemma for the UN and the international
community in reconciling realpolitik, humanitarian priorities and the importance
of the principle of non-use of force, are reflected in the Cambodian peace
settlement. The UN has sent personnel to Cambodia to keep the peace and to
prevent a "return to the universally condemned policies and practices of the
recent past" - a euphemism for the killings in Cambodia under Poi Pot. Yet the
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West and China have guaranteed the Khmer Rouge's inclusion in the Cambodian
political process because to exclude them would be to condone the Vietnamese
overthrow of the Khmer Rouge regime."126
Klintworth concluded, " ... While the UN could take no practical action in
Cambodia in 1978-79, it may be less unwilling to act in the future for two
reasons: the growing acceptance that sometimes there is an obligation on the UN
to intervene, and the commitment of Security Council prestige to achieving a
lasting peace in Cambodia. In the new world order, UN intervention on
humanitarian grounds would be acceptable to most States, if it were seen to be
impartial, consistent, transparent, and limited in its objectives." 121

(g) The "1 3 June 1 992" Cantonment Deadline and the
Renewed Targeting of the Khmer Rouge by the
Media
The thirteenth of June had been the date settled on for the cantonment of 70 per
cent of soldiers of the four Khmer factions, (Phase Two), under UNTAC
supervision. As the date approached, it was obvious that the Khmer Rouge was
unwilling to comply. The press response in Australia was savage. The Sydney
Morning Herald 12 June editorial "Cold comfort in Cambodia" looked
sceptically on Senator Evans -assurances that the Khmer Rouge were engaged
only in "brinkmanship" in refusing to demobilize its army. The paper claimed the
Khmer Rouge had ''regularly violated the ceasefire since a peace plan was signed
by Cambodia's warring factions last October." The paper cited the KR's refusal
to allow the Head of UNTAC, Mr Yasushi Akashi, entry into territory they
control in Western Cambodia the previous fortnight and their rejection, at the
emergency UNTAC/Khmer faction meeting, of "all appeals to join the
demobilisation process". 128
The Herald dismissed as 'red herrings' the specific Khmer Rouge demands
concerning UNTAC verification of the withdrawal of all Vietnamese troops and
their insistence of the elevation of the SNC to a "de facto government with
legislative and executive powers" in place of the Hun Sen administration. The
paper argued, "... UN observers are satisfied there is no significant Vietnamese
troop presence in Cambodia I\Tld common sense suggest Hanoi has nothing to
gain by concealing one. But tfie Herald in its editorial does not identify which
UN officials were 'satisfied' its to the total Vietnamese troop withdrawal or
whether 'satisfied' is the same thing as confirmed. '29
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On the second point, the Herald argued,
... As to the SNC, it was established to represent Cambodia externally and to
advise UNTA C. But the everyday running of C�mbodia was to be left to
UNTAC until a freely elected government comes.-into power next year. To
demand changes to that arrangement now means scuttling the October peace
accords and going back to the drawing board.

But here the paper ignores that "everyday running of Cambodia" was still in the
hands of the Hun Sen faction and not UNTAC. UNTAC had failed to take up
their complete responsibilities because of Hun Sen's refusal to hand over power
of the key ministries. If anything, it was UNTAC that shared the blame as it was
'scuttling' a key plank of the peace plan by abrogating its administrative
responsibilities. 130
The Herald then foreshadowed the new direction of UNTAC by quoting
UNTAC Military leader General John Sanderson saying, "the UN peacekeepers
have no mandate to enforce the peace plan. They do have a responsibility to
protect factions which comply with the plan." The editorial concluded that even
if Evans was right on the "brinkmanship" issue, the JQ)mer Rouge actions and its
protests "at this late stage"131 raised a serious question about whether it (the KR)
"can be trusted to honour the result of elections it is almost certain to lose next
year". Then the paper described Keating's April statement to pull Australian
troops out if it was judged that the situation was "beyond redemption" as "good
sense". It concluded, "Ultimately, only the Cambodians themselves can make
peace. If, in the end, the Khmer Rouge chooses to do otherwise, we will need to
look for a new approach entirely to that challenge." But the paper did not
elaborate on what this new approach would be. 132
The Australian editorial on 15 June, "Disarming the Khmer Rouge" 1 33 took a

similar line. It chastised the "intransigience" of the Khmer Rouge for its "totally
unreasonable demands", which were a "frightening reminder of that
organisation's record", as there was "no evidence that there are Vietnamese
forces in the country, certainly not in such strengths as to hinder UNTAC or to
strengthen the position of Hun Sen's government." Again the proof of this was
not verification but simply the political assertion that Vietnam would not want to
"alienate all those countries now giving it the aid it so urgently needs". As to the
demand for "plenary powers to the SNC" this was probably because "the Khmer
Rouge estimates that it will fail to win the foreshadowed elections". Writing well
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before the KR had withdrawn from the election process, The Australian
predicted that once the ejection of a democratic government occurs next year
then the onus is still on nations such as Australia to be 'vigilant' and "offer the
Cambodian people our help to prevent the Khmer Rouge from returning to
power." 134

(h) September 1 992 -The Keating Visit to Phnom Penh
Press coverage of the Keating visit stressed its morale boosting role for
Australian troops and the flagging optimism of the whole UNTAC operation in
the light of the KR failing to meet the June 1 992 deadline for disarmament. His
visit was overshadowed by his Japan visit that immediately proceeded it. The
'whistle-stop' one-day visit to Phnom Penh, the first by a residing Western Head
of State, was perceived domestically in the Australian media as part of his build
up to the Australian Federal elections. It was also read as an attempt to dissipitate
fears that Australia was getting cold feet over Cambodia's peace plan.
The Sydney Morning Herald/Age Goodweekend, anticipating the Keating visit,
ran a story coinciding with the Keating visit by Sydney Morning Herald foreign
affairs correspondent, Tony Wright, "Pall over Phnom Penh, Cambodia's new
found peace is marred by poverty" . 135 Wright concluded this report by praising
Australia's role in the peace pr(lCeSs and saying that it will improve our image in
Asia even if our involvement is seen as "a finely balanced process between
compassion for a tortured people and pragmatic benefits for Australia". As for
the condition of Phnom Penh, Wright argued, "Even if it has brought with it the
ugly aspects of a real estate speculation boom amid poverty, and even if it forces
Australian officials to carry bags of cash across borders it is better to light one
small candle than to curse the darkness". The context of this comment was his
observation that an Australian foreign affairs official had carried $600,000 in US
banknotes to purchase a new Embassy for Australia in Phnom Penh. A building,
we were told, that had already increased in value to $2.7 million in just a few
months.
This article was typical of the roving Western correspondent for its short
sightedness; if only because Wright did not link the appalling poverty of the
average Cambodian peasant with the real estate speculation and other corruption
tolerated by the authorities ilf Phnom Penh. He comforted his reader by the
apparent gloating over the Australian Government's speculative windfall and by
saying the cash for the Australian Embassy purchase was "carefully audited at
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both ends of the journey". The issue of what hap�ned to it after it was handed
over to the Hun Sen administration remained unexplained. 136
The same night as the Keating visit to Phnom Penh in September 1992 hit the
evening news programs in Australia both Foreign i:;orrespondent (ABCTV) and
Dateline (SBS-TV) current affairs programmes 13' screened similar items on
Khmer Rouge business links with Thailand. Underlying this theme was the
floated option of imposing an economic boycott on the Khmer Rouge if they
refuse to disarm. Thus these programs served as almost a 'feasibility study' for
an Evans initiative to move for economic sanctions against the Khmer Rouge
should they fail to submit to disarmament before the UNTAC supervised
elections in May 1993.
Peter George's reporting for Foreign Correspondent was the more strident of the
two presentations. He described Pailin, (the Khmer Rouge's 'de facto' provincial
capital), as nothing more than a few dirt tracks with an obviously poverty
stricken population of about 25,000. The suggestion was the money from timber
and gems did not benefit the people here. True. But George did not raise the issue
of how the people in Pailin fared when compared to the rest of the country. Nor
did he state the obvious - that these rural peasants '.*'ere in receipt of none of the
UN humanitarian aid lavished on Phnom Penh and other parts of the country
under programs controlled by the other SNC factions.
George suggested that he had convinced the Khmer Rouge into letting him ride
in a jeep into Pailin under their escort. He tells the viewer he has been warned by
the soldiers not to film the gem mining areas that dot the road into town. He
'secretly' films but the Khmer Rouge escorts take no retaliatory action. No
mention is made by George that he was part of an extensive Bangkok media
contingent that had their visit to Pailin pre-arranged in advance by agreement
between UNTAC and the NADK. 138 The purpose of this journey is to witness the
arrival of UNTAC's civilian head, Mr Atashi in Pailin. The television viewer is
left thinking the report must be giving the truth because of the danger the
journalist went through to obtain it.
The Dateline reporter was not so adventurous. Yet, her theme was the same as
Foreign Correspondent - to link the Khmer Rouge's control over gems mining
and timber logging trade with Thailand as a financial source of its arms
purchases. The argument was that if an economic embargo was imposed on this
trade it could prevent the Khmer Rouge undermining the peace process. The
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logic here seems to be that a blockade of Khmer Rouge capitalism will stop them
mounting a communist takeover at some later date.
But there were other contradictions. The Dateline report revealed the Hun Sen
regime actually exported more of Cambodia's timber stock over the Eastern side
of Cambodia into Vietnam. Whether this income was also used for arms
purchases was not disclosed. As one of the Khmer Rouge primary reasons for
refusing the UNTAC mandate remained Vietnam's economic and demographic
encroachment onto Khmer sovereignty it begs the question as to why there was
no attempt by either current affairs program to examine the Cambodian
Vietnamese border? A thorough monitoring of the Australian media for the 12
month period up to February 1993 revealed only one brief mention of UNTAC' s
inadequate supervision of the Vietnamese movements through the Eastern
Cambodian border.1 39

(i) How Australia's Domestic Immigration Policy
Unhinged the Foreign Policy Line on Cambodia
In October 199 1 the international media generated much speculation that the
Khmer Rouge would forcibly repatriate refugees under their control in the Thai
camps back over the border. The issue featured strongly in the international news
sections of The Australian. 140 l}y March 1992 the emphasis switched to reports
from CARE Australia executives over the growing difficulties of the logistics of
the UN repatriation operation. The Herald Sun carried "Farce warning on
refugees' return" while a Sydney Morning Herald editoriaJ 141 warned continuing
fighting inside Cambodia may produce "a stampede in the other direction". The
West Australian had "Foreign aid delays slow refugee work", complete with a
photo of former Prime Minister Fraser as CARE Director touring resettlement
sites at Battambang.142 A Newsweek feature, "The perilous road home", had Ron
Moreau in Sisophon where "UN peacekeepers face their biggest challenge ever:
repatriating thousands of Cambodian refugees - and keeping the Khmer Rouge
at bay". 143
But concern with the civil liberties of the repatriated refugees from the Thai
camps, or for that matter those facing repatriation from Hong Kong to Vietnam,
became overshadowed in the Australian media in the wake of the arrival of a new
influx of Cambodian 'boat people' on Australia's Northern shores. These new
arrivals, augmented by Chinese· 'boat people' arriving as 'economic refugees' off
the West Australian coast near Port Hedland, became a major media event. The
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arrivals coincided with an upsurge of domestic concern in Australia over
continued immigration at a time of high unemployment.
A sample of the press will demonstrate this new :found concern. The Sydney
Morning Herald editorial on immigration in late)anuary 1992'44 noted that
immigration Minister Hand distanced himself from PM Keating's claim that the
Liberal opposition's policy had racist overtones. The editorial called for an
informed debate on the issue of immigration. It generally supported moves by the
government to end the "unintended imbalance" caused by the "humanitarian
assistance program", exacerbated by the new boat people arrivals. It called also
for the government to dispel the myth that we were "being swamped by Asian
immigration and the false alarm about a dramatic increase in the number of boat
people heading for our northern shores". In the same breath, the editorial
demanded a new immigration/refugee intake balance that was more closely
geared to labour market requirements.'45 In February The Herald' editorial "The
refugees and the rorter" supported the Government's decision to 'streamline' the
assessment process over refugee status. It said Minister Hand's reference to
'rorters' using legal delaying tactics to postpone or alter their repatriation after
failing the refugee test was 'tough talk'. However the paper advocated
'flexibility' in enforcement to avoid miscarriages ol' justice. Then in early April
1992 the popular tabloid Daily Telegraph Mirror'47 blew up a Keating interview
on the SBSTV program Dateline the previous evening where he forecast a cut in
immigration for the coming year. Keating refused to be drawn on whether the
thirty eight Cambodian boat people who were refused refugee status should be
allowed to remain in Australia on humanitarian grounds because the matter was
before the courts.
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Four days later a page three report "Cambodians escape custody" in the same
paper threw fuel on the fire. Four of the rejected Cambodian detainees carried out
a desperate escape from a Sydney detention centre. Under pressure the
government was reported as backing down by admitting a 'defect' in the
screening process. 148 Telegraph cartoonist Warren's cartoon the same day
pictured a refugee looking down an open drain with the sign 'hope' indicating his
way out. 149 The implication was the Federal Government had bungled and was
insensitive. In mid-April, The Australian 's editorial "Our inept refugee
program"1 50 concluded that the government's new restriction were justified but
the "erratic feature of the present system" meant we may as well let the 400 boat
people stay.
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A letter in the Sydney Morning Herald 151 argued, "(that) returning refugees will
not be killed by Cambodian authorities, although they may be killed in a civil war
or by the Khmer Rouge." This highlighted the Government' s dilemma of arguing
the peace process in Cambodia was working and it was safe for the Cambodians
to return home. By May the government was really on the back foot152 and was
depicted by the media as insensitive after rushing through changes to the
Immigration Act, with Opposition support, to "derail" the appeal to the Federal
Court by boat people. Mr Hand defended the action (specifically aimed at the
boat people) by saying they arrived in Australia "illegally" and was aimed at
heading off those trying to by-pass the system through legal appeals.
The Sydney tabloid Daily Telegraph Mirror 153 banner page one headline "Hand
gets tough, boat people warned as more arrive" where those on board the Chinese
sampan arriving in Darwin, could be "thrown out of the country within weeks".
We were told their arrival was the tenth since 1989. The Warren cartoon the same
day had a stern-faced Hand ordering the boat people back into the water. The op
ed column by Sue Williams was less convinced and added sarcastically,
They fled a country soaked in the blood of more than a million citizens cut
down by the Khmer Rouge. But naturally, uppermost in their minds was the
chance of a nice little mansion in Point Piper ... Last week, continuedfighting
in Cambodia left seven solqiers dead, and 22 more injured in the worst
violations of the UN sponsored ceasefire so far. If it gets any worse, we may
well pull out our troops. If this ragged little group of desperate people are
pushed screaming and sobbing into the next plane, it will forever shame any
reputation we have left forfairness, justice and compassion. 1 54

Clearly, the government's need to tighten up on immigration ran counter to its
foreign policy line of arguing that the Cambodian peace process was on track
(and the returnees had nothing to fear in going back to Cambodia). The 'Chinese
student' option - a temporary moratorium - had been cut-off by the political
perception that Hawke had made a mistake in his 1989 emotional decision.
The media remained divided. The counter-view advocating realpolitik on
sovereignty and immigration was advanced by P.P. McGuiness with his article
"We must not surrender to boat people blackmail". 155 In the Sydney Sunday
Telegraph the influential commentator John Laws, weighed in and warned that
immigration was not about Australia "providing a giant soup kitchen in the
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Southern Hemisphere" and accused the Federal Government of not having an
immigration policy. 156 By June the issue came to.a head with a David Jenkins
investigative feature in the Sydney Morning Herald, "Destination Darwin", with
a huge map showing the conspiratorial route of Chinese boat people into
Australia. "The latest wave of boat people sees a.risky path and a better life;
Australia sees a refugee racket and a growing threat, writes David Jenkins". 157
In mid-June Mr Justice Einfield addressed the National Press Club on behalf of
National Refugee Week. His widely reported criticism of the government's
handling of the boat people crisis had a softening impact on the media line. The
Sydney Morning Herald 158 referred to the Einfield 'broadside'. The paper
criticised Einfield's argument about the privileged..position of Chinese students
when Cambodian boat people face a more desperate situation. Chinese students
benefited by a "one off Prime Ministerial intervention in usual procedures", an
"exception", a 'quirk of history'.
Paradoxically, this exception alarmed "many people" and led to the current hard
line, thus making it more difficult for the Cambodian boat people. The paper
argued, "Australia cannot afford to send a signal to potential illegal immigrants
- by lenient treatment of Cambodian boat people').Yet our immigration policy
should be "a balance" between "sentiment alone" and "ruthless efficiency of
bureaucracy". More importantly, the paper concluded that immigration
"... involves broader foreign policy considerations, including to begin with, what
action we can take to preventing repressive regimes (causing people) to flee their
homes."
The editorial broadly reflected an emerging media and community consensus as
politicians ducked for cover and generally sought to shift media attention to other
issues. Keating and Evans let the Immigration Minister carry the can and they
concentrated on promoting the "positive" aspects of our 'push to Asia'. The issue
became buried amid claim and counter-claim involving Hand's portfolio, the
courts, lawyers and bureaucrats. 159 Foreign Minister Evans ran cold on the issue
lest it impact on the unravelling shortcomings of his Cambodian peace plan. By
the time the Federal elections arrived in early 1993 Keating could proudly
announce to the media figures which showed a massive drop in immigration
levels without a whimper being raised about the status of the detained
Cambodian boat people.
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(j) The Australian Media on Cambodia in the 1 993
Lead-up to the May Elections
Coverage of Cambodia in the Australian media during 1993 has been sporadic.
The decision by the UN Security Council to proceed with the elections without
the participation of the Khmer Rouge brought the diplomatic aspects of the Paris
agreement back into focus in January. There was much media speculation about
whether UNTAC had been a failure and whether the UN Security Council had
the mandate to change the UNTAC brief from peace keepers to peace enforcers.
Attention was drawn to the general break down of law and order and the decision
to send an Australian judge to Cambodia as part of an enhanced judicial/law
enforcement role to be adopted by UNTAC.
Most media attention was directed towards demonstrating the positive role of the
Australian contingent of UNTAC force. To this end the Melbourne Herald Sun
has run a regular column penned by one of the officer serving in Cambodia. In
March, a week long series of reports from Sally Neighbour was run on ABC
News and ATV News covering such issues as a profile on Australian Khmer
refugees who returned to help with reconstruction and running the election, the
problems of resettlement for the returnees from the Thai border camps and
Australian soldiers running English speaking courses in their spare time.
Other issues featured in the media include the capture, hostage taking, and
subsequent release, of both military and civilian UNTAC personnel after they
had crossed into Khmer Rouge controlled areas. Political assassinations of
electoral workers was another issue. Here the evidence pointed towards agents
of the Hun Sen administration. However, the Khmer Rouge were accused of
responsibility by the Hun Sen faction. The Australian media left the issue of
blame unresolved but, more often than not, suggested Khmer Rouge culpability.
A similar pattern emerged with the random massacres of groups of Vietnamese
civilians. While both the Khmer Rouge and KPNLF had been expressing public
dissatisfaction with the UNTAC's inability to contain the flow of new settlers
from Vietnam into Cambodia, the massacres were almost universally blamed on
the Khmer Rouge faction. However official Khmer Rouge denials were carried
in the various reports.
On the ABC's Report From Asia in March, Indochina correspondent Evan
Williams reported from Phnom Penh on the issue of "ethnic violence". He
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interviewed the UNHCR Director Denis McNamara who expressed concern at
the attacks on Vietnamese settlers. He argued "the nature of UNT AC had
changed because of the failure of cantonment.", He argued the UN Security
Council had reiterated the mandate included "protective security" of those
participating in the electoral process. UNTAC was:Cmpowered to launch special
prosecutions to act as a clear deterrent to ethnic violence, but without
"superseding the local authorities". 160
All this demonstrates that the attempts to impose the electoral solution on
Cambodia in 1993, without first resolving the basic grievances of the Khmer
factions - sovereignty, power sharing arrange!llents, confirmation of the
Vietnamese withdrawal - was a fundamental flaw in the UN bartered peace. It
was a flaw in which much of the Western media share responsibility. Had they
done their homework better in the lead up to the May 1993 elections then the
inevitable debacle may have been avoided, or at least minimised.
Part of the explanation for this shortcoming relates to what media analyst and
academic Rod Tiffen pointed out in his 1978 book on "newsmaking" in
Southeast Asia,
... News values, assumptions about audience interests and attitudes, the
production andformat demands ofnews organisations, the differing priority
and authority accorded to different news sources, all constitute a very
considerable and limiting prism through which Southeast Asian news is
filtered to Australia. 161

The news on Cambodia is filtered in a number of ways at present. Firstly, by
what Australian foreign correspondents inside Cambodia regard as newsworthy.
This can often be influenced by their sources. Secondly, it is filtered by the fact
that there are still only a very small number of journalists who are regularly
reporting on Cambodia. In Australia only a mere handful of reporters cover
foreign affairs. The quality of their work is mixed with regionally based reports
not always superior in quality to Australian sourced material. Thirdly, it is
filtered by the continued dominance over the media of large institutions who
forever constrict what can be legitimately reported - either because of
commercial or political reasons.
In developing an 'Asianist' or 'Cambodianist' perspective, Australian journalists
should be wary making any concessions, or engaging in self-censorship, or
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offering succour, to those reactionary regional leaders of whatever political
persuasion who suppress their own people and then hide behind the slogan of
"We do it differently in Asia". But journalists should also remember the the
Cambodian state as such, is a weak and divided one. It is much easier to write
criticism of Cambodian political leaders than it is of Indonesian, Malaysian or
even Fijian leaders. If our aim is national reconciliation and an internal, rather
than external solution to Cambodia, then we should write accordingly.
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by Stephan Solarz exerting US pressure in favor of Evans. A Fretilin
representative in Sydney has argued in 1 992 to this author that this was also
because of an Alitas-Evans trade-off to bury the East Timor issue. This
latter aspect is a point that Vickers appears either unaware of, or not
inclined to make public . .,_
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Editorial "Cambodia's next experiment" Sydney Morning Herald, 15
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96.

Good Weekend supplement 14 December 199 l . Also distributed with The
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97. L. Murdoch, The Age & Sydney Morning Herald, Good Weekend
Magazine section, 14 December 1991.
98.
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p.8, reprinted from The Age.

99.

Weekend Australian, 26-27 October 199 1, p l 6.
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profile on him, written by Steve Heder, linking him to the Toul Sleng
interrogation centre. This document was widely circulated in the
international press at the time by pro-Hun S;n groups. It's circulation was
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IOI. Dateline, 27 November 199 1.
102. The Age, 28 November 1991. "Khmer leaders attacked on return",
103. Stan Sessor,'Report from Cambodia', The New Yorker, 18 May 1992, from
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104. Sydney Morning Herald, editorial "Samphan ran out of town again",
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demonstration the following day was controlled by Khmer and Vietnamese
that were not from the university. Sessor argues that an SPK television
video clearly showed "complicity by the police and soldiers guarding the
house". Thus The New Yorker, if it is to be believed, reveals more than a
little superficiality in the Australian press version of events.
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In December 1991 there were also student protests in Phnom Penh
mounted against charges of corruption by Hun Sen officials and ministers.
The students alleged there was wide-scale selling off of Cambodian assets
with the profits being privately pocketed. During these protests a number
of students were killed by the police and army. The Australian press were
notably mute about the details of these protests. One freelance journalist,
Helen Jarvis, on her return to Australia in early 1992 was interviewed by
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contradicted by Sessor's article in The New Yorker.
107. The Daily Telegraph Mirtor, 2 February 1992. "Women for War Zone",
pp. 1-2.
108. Mark Baker, "Don't sell your sword shares", The Age, 20 March 1992.
109. Bangkok Post, from Oddar Meanchey (AP/Reuters), 9 March 1992. See
also Bangkok Post, Phnom Penh (UPI/Reuter), "Cambodia warns of food
shortages" 9 March 1992, quoting SOC's Hor Nam Hong appeal for aid
and KR pledging a continuation of fighting until Vietnam's withdrawal is
confirmed.
110. Weekend Australian, 2-3 May 1992, p.16.
111. See also Canberra Time"s!Mid Week Magazine, 25 March 1992, "The
Liberation of Angkor Wat, Susan Aitkin reports", (feature article).
112. The Age ran with "Lib threatens to oppose peace force" (28 March 1992).
The Canberra Times reported the Government's response as "Opposition
'negative carping' criticised" (31 March 1992).
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1 13. Reflecting on the reports from Cambodia ttie Financial Review ran David
Lague's "UN peacekeeping efforts at standstill in Cambodia" on 3 1 March.
The next day in the same paper Peter Roqinson opinion column argued,
"Cambodia a tough test for UN dream", ( I .April 1992).
;

1 14. Sydney Morning Herald, editorial, "Before our troops go to Cambodia"
3 1 March 1992, p. I 0.
1 15. Tony Parkinson, "killing fields give no peace of mind" The Australian,
1 April I 992, p. 1 1, where Liberal Senator Durack's spokesman was also
reported as saying: "... the morale of the troops will not be enhanced if large
numbers, or even small numbers, are injure� fighting for ill-defined aims...
regardless of what the troops think, there is a political requirement to define
the aims so that we understand the nature of our contribution ... If there is a
departure from the original objectives of the Paris peace settlements, every
country should be entitled to reassess its position."
1 16. The Canberra Times, 2 April 1992.
1 17. D. Lague, Financial Review, 2 April 1992. ,.
1 18. M. Metheral "Peace in Cambodia may yet bring battle at home", The Age
op. ed. page, 2 April 1992.
1 19. Sydney Morning Herald, editorial, "On into the killing fields" 3 April 1992.
120. The Australian editorial "Treading warily in Cambodia", 3 April 1992,
p. 10.
12 1 F. Devine,"A future in Asia requires courage", The Australian, Monday 6
April 1992, p.9.
122. F. Devine, The Australian, ibid. Devine enlarges on this theme by reference
to conversations with Cardinal Edward Clancy gleaned from the Cardinal's
recent inspection tour of Australian Catholic Relief's programs inside
Cambodia. Clancy noted "many Cambodians have comparably inflated
expectations of Australia's capacity to help." Clancy identified the two
biggest threats as the "totalitarian Khmer Rouge" and "endemic official
corruption (of Phnom Penh)". Clancy noted "ACR and Australia generally
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have made a moral commitment to Cambodia from which it is now almost
impossible to withdraw". Further, the circumstances under which ACR
would withdraw would "probably rely on the judgement of people on the
spot."
1 23. Sunday Telegraph, (Sydney), 29 March 1992, p.48. 'Insight' page of
'views on important issues'.
1 24. See Sue Downie /Phnom Penh, "Cambodians 'have fought final battle' ,
Weekend Australian, 4-5.4.92, p.8, Sue Downie "Cambodia in the hands of
a peace broker", Weekend Australian, 9- 1 0 May 1992, p. 1 3, "Diggers
rough it in Cambodia", Weekend Australian, 1 8-19 April 1992, p.9, "Evans
supports Japan as peace-keeper in Cambodia", Financial Review 1 0 April
1992, p. 1 0.
1 25."Changing world order offers hope to the underdogs" The Australian,
23 June 1992, p.1 3.
1 26. G. Klintworth, The Australian, ibid., Klintworth deliberately distorts the
UNTAC mandate here in order to prop up his own political barrel. The UN
mandate is a much wider one and includes provision for the withdrawal of
Vietnamese troops.
1 27. In the wake of the Gulf war outcome of early 1991 Gary Klintworth argued
in "Crimes Against Humanity", Far East Economic Review, 20 December
1990, p. 1 4 that "Cambodia's Pol Pot would seem to be a better candidate
to appear before a war crimes tribunal than Iraq's Saddam Hussein."
1 28. Sydney Morning Herald, editorial, "Cold comfort in Cambodia", 1 2 June
1992, p.14.
1 29. The problem here was it depended on which UN observer you were talking
too. On the verification issue it has surely been the fundamental question
of the whole war. On the handing over of power to the SNC this was a KR
response to UNTAC favoring the Hun Sen administration and not fulfilling
its UN mandate. The Sydney Morning Herald position on this was quite
clear. Its editorial ("Cambodia: the path to peace", 3 1 August I 990, p. 1 0)
stated "But control of day,:to-day affairs of State- including foreign affairs,
defence and public security, finance and information - would be turned
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over to UN administrators until elections could be held and a new
government installed Hun Sen has balked �t. ceding that much power But
any outright rejection of the UN peace plan would surely rebound against
Hun Sen."
130. Such a view was supported by a number of internationally based journalists
covering the issue. See for example Jacques Bekaert writing in the Bangkok
Post.
13 1. Surely if the KR had protested too early they would have been accused of
not allowing UNTAC sufficient time to implement their administration or
confirm that Vietnamese troops were withdrawn?
132 I don't enter the realm of discussion here about who actually holds state
power in Cambodia in international law except to say that as the Khmer
Rouge remains on the SNC, as the NADK faction, and sits at the UN, The
Herald position is tantamount to calling for self-determination and foreign
intervention in the one breath?
133. The Australian, editorial, "Disarming the Khmer Rouge", 15 June 1 992,
�
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134 The Australian 's editorial on 15 June 1992.
135. Sydney Morning Herald/Age Good Weekend 26 September 1992, pp. 18-22.
136. Sessor in his April 1992 The New Yorker article (op. sit.) points out that
dealing in cash encourages currency fluctuations that further impoverishes
the Khmer masses in Phnom Penh. Australia getting a real estate bargain is
probably what Wright means by Australia gaining "pragmatic benefits"
over its involvement in Cambodia.
137. Foreign Correspondent (ABC-TV) and Dateline (SBS-TV) Saturday 26
September 1992.
138. This was confirmed by the author with another Australian journalist who
made the journey from Bangkok.
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139. That occasion was when a journalist reporting for Dateline in May 1992
flew by UNTAC helicopter (Australian contingent) to one of the check
points near the Eastern border of Cambodia. He interviewed an Australian
soldier stationed there. The soldier confirmed that there was absolutely no
monitoring of human or commercial traffic from Vietnam into Cambodia.
140. James Pringle report The Australian 22 October 1991 and AFP,
"Cambodian refugees safe from forced repatriation". Weekend Australian
23-24 October 199 1 .
141. Sydney Morning Herald editorial, 31 March 1992.
142. West Australian 13 April 1992. p.35.
143. Newsweek, in The Bulletin, April 1992, pp.76-79.
144. Editorial, 'Avoiding the racism debate', Sydney Morning Herald,
23 January 1992, p.12.
145. This viewpoint was echoed by an editorial in The Australian 19 March
1992, p.8, and was critical of the failure of the Business Migration Plan to
attract people to Australia who were matched to labour market shortages.
146. Editorial, "The refugees and the rorters", Sydney Morning Herald,
14 February 1992, p.10.
147. "Keating forecasts cut in immigration" Daily Telegraph Mirror, J O April
1992, p.22.
148. Daily Telegraph Mirror 14 April 1992, p.3.
149. Daily Telegraph Mirror 14 April 1992, p.12.
150. Editorial, "Our lnept Refugee Program", The Australian, 15 April 1992.
151. Letter to editor, "The lessons of history", Sydney Morning Herald, 24 April
1992, p.14.
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152. Margaret Easterbrook,"Boat people caught in the rush", The Age, 7 May
1992, p.11, op-ed. page, argued, "One factor that has been cast aside is that
the Cambodians have fled their homeland in fear of their lives with only the
clothes on their backs." Tanner's cartoon the same day shows two refugees
staggering ashore (into Australia) to be ipmediately faced by a stern-faced
Gerry Hand. The same day the Sydney Morning Herald (7 May 1992, p.5)
reported "Hand ignores human rights protests" and "We'd rather die here
than be sent home, say refugees." The second article used photos that
highlighted the divisions being created in' the community with one showing
a refugee in Port Hedland behind a cyclone wire fence, the second showed
local miners saying they wanted jobs for locals first and the third showing
the local Mayor with hands covering his face in anguish. The same day
(7 May 1992), the editorial, noted that Hand wanted to send "a clear
message" to potential boat people.
153. Daily Telegraph Mirror, 11 May 1992.
154. Daily Telegraph Mirror 1 l May 1992, p.12.
155. The Weekend Australian 9-10 May 1992, p.2. the Weekend Australian
Review section the same day led with a major article by science writer
Julian Cribb on the "growing conflict, between world population, food
supply and the environment". The article served as a contextualiser for the
McGuinness anti-compassion line, the Weekend Australian Review, 9-10
May 1992, pp. l -2.
156. Sunday Telegraph "Let's freeze immigration until the recession ends, too
many going onto dole payments", l O May 1992, p.21.
157. Sydney Morning Herald 'Spectrum' section, 6 June 1992, pp. 35-36. A
spokeswomen from the Refugee Council of Australia interviewed by the
author in mid 1992 argued that certain sections of the Jenkins article could
only have come from the Department of Immigration. To make matters
worse, they may have been inaccurate.
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158. Editorial, "Equal Treatment for refugees", Sydney Morning Herald, 23
June 1992, p.16.
159. For example see "Tribunal plan cuts refugee rights", Sydney Morning
Herald, 24 June 1992, p.3.
160. ABC Radio, Report From Asia, 2 1 March 1993.
16 1. Chomsky and Herman take this filtering a step further and argue news
filtering is one aspect of what they call a "propaganda model" which
explains the role of Western media. Under this model double standards
abound. The broad conflict between 'principle' and 'pragmatism' is
characteristic of Australian foreign policy in recent years. Witness the
Kuwait versus East Timor intervention debate 199 1-92.
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The Centre seeks to Provide a focus for the study of communication and culture
in the Asia region. Australia's increasing involvement in Asia requires an
awareness of Asian media processes and institutions, their cultural positioning
and discourses. Additionally there is a need to understand the way in which the
Australian media report Asia. These two discourses intersect and shape both the
flow of public information between the two regions and their understanding of
each other. An attempt to achieve an awareness of this complex process
determines the aims, objectives and research programme of the Centre for Asian
Communication, Media and Cultural Studies.

Alms and Objectives.
The Centre aims to:
• develop a research profile in the field of Asian Communication, media and
cultural studies;
• promote an awareness of the importance of the emerging mediascape to
contemporary Asian affairs;
• bring together academics, journalists and students working in the area to
explore current and relevant issues and topics in the field of Asian
communication and cultural studies;
• organise seminars, workshops, and conferences to promote research in the
field;
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• establish a Visiting Scholar programme.
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look at the impact of satellite television and cable television systems
respectively. The Centre is also involved in .research that is examining issues
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significance throughout Asia.

Disclaimer
The views expressed in this publication do not necessarily reflect those held by
the Centre for Asian Communication, Media and Cultural Studies, or Edith
Cowan University.

69

